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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
On September 12, 2005, the Republic of Korea (ROK) Ministry of National 
Defense (MND) unveiled its reform plan, known as Defense Reform Plan 2020 (the 
Reform Plan), anticipating that it would build a smaller but stronger military by reducing 
177,000 ROK Army personnel from the 548,000 total, and increasing the current 
manpower ratio of officers and non-commissioned officers from 20 percent to 40 percent 
by the end of the year 2020.  The current ratios of 9:11:80 among officers, NCOs, and 
enlisted personnel in the ROK Army clearly show that the current ROK Army is highly 
personnel centric, especially depending on enlisted personnel and, therefore, unfit to 
fulfill the anticipation of the hi-tech armed force envisioned in the Reform Plan. 
The research defines the Reform Plan as a set of “Top-Down” approaches 
generated by the top decision makers through a form of capabilities-based planning to 
determine adequate capabilities of the ROK Army as a whole entity.  The research then 
concludes that this method should be followed by numerous “Bottom-Up” approaches by 
manpower planners for each unit within the ROK Army organization.  When all the 
Bottom-Up approaches are aggregately incorporated into one manpower force structure, 
the ROK Army manpower force structure will be finalized through continuous reviews 
and practices.  Therefore, the research selected a ROK Army infantry battalion and built a 
model of future infantry battalion as one Bottom-Up approach to conform to the direction 
of the Reform Plan.   
In order to conduct a Bottom-Up approach, the research selects three advanced 
military ground forces, namely the United States Army (USA), United States Marine 
Corps (USMC) and Taiwanese Army, to benchmark their infantry battalions in forms of 
Modified Tables of Organizations and Equipment (MTOE).  By conducting a 
comparative factors analysis of the organizations, the research identifies capabilities that 
the current ROK Army infantry battalion lacks and determines required capabilities for 
the battalion.  By incorporating the required capabilities, a future model of a more 
operationally flexible ROK Army infantry battalion is built.  This model suggests that the 
future force ratios among officers, NCOs and enlisted personnel of the current ROK 
 xvi
battalion should be changed from 4.7:4.7:90.6 to 4.6:21.1:76.3.  From the model, the 
research concludes that, in the ROK Army infantry battalion, the NCO ratio should be 
increased from 4.7 percent to at least 21.1 percent. 
Because of the inherent purpose of the current manpower accession, the ROK 
military does not have any choice but to remain unfit for what the Reform Plan will 
demand in the future.  In order for the military to attract high-quality manpower in a hi-
tech future military, innovations in the ROK military accession and personnel 
management systems are mandatory, as is an adequate allocation of defense resources.  
Therefore, the research finds that a transformational mindset must be formulated among 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE 
The ROK Army continues to expend considerable effort toward transforming 
itself into a technology-based armed force by introducing advanced weapons and 
operation support systems for the twenty-first century battlefield.  However, without the 
right mixture of human resources—comprising the proper skills, education, and training 
needed to execute missions in a new, technology-oriented armed force—the ROK Army 
may hinder its attempt to transform itself into a “smaller but stronger”1 military in the 
near future.  This research was conducted to examine recently transformed military 
manpower force structures to analyze factors that support changes in force ratio among 
officers, non-commissioned officers (NCO), and enlisted personnel.  It will examine 
manpower force structures to meet tomorrow’s battlefield environments, and recommend 
feasible methodologies to the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army optimize its manpower 
ratios.   
1. Background 
Changes in modern warfare require continuous reforms in the concept of military 
operations and military employment.  Since the end of the Cold War, weapons systems 
and information technologies have advanced dramatically.  The execution of war today 
has become more technology oriented and these advances will continue into the future.   
Military power consists of two essential elements: the human resource element 
and the physical resource element.  If a military power is to be maximized, these two 
elements must be cultivated in a reciprocal and synergistic manner.  A technology 
oriented armed force is more likely to be victorious in today’s battlefield environment. 
Therefore, it is ironic and interesting that the human resource element has become even 
more crucial as advanced weapons systems become more important in overcoming 
potential adversaries in future warfare.  War fighters require the right knowledge, skills, 
and abilities—acquired through education and training—to properly operate newly 
procured and advanced technology weaponry.  Hence, the widely spread mandate for 
many countries today to place the right human resource elements into their militaries—
                                                 
1 Jin-Suk Kang, Korean National Strategy and Defense Reform (Seoul: Pyung Dan, 2005). 
2 
personnel who are trained for today’s and tomorrow’s battlefields and who will remain in 
the military for an optimum return on investment.  When transforming a military that has 
been very personnel dependent in the past, into a military that is equipped with future 
technology and information science, “qualitative elitism”2 is essential in the military 
manpower force structure. 
The Republic of Korea Army is not an exception to these challenges.  On 
September 12, 2005, the Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense (MND) 
unveiled its reform plan, known as “Defense Reform Plan 2020,” anticipating that it 
would build a smaller but stronger military.  There is growing concern within the Korean 
defense manpower community, that the manpower force structure of the ROK Army is 
still too big—and largely personnel intensive—to fulfill the anticipation.  The current 
situation is quite contrary to military reform; because downsizing is a precondition for 
any common military reform. This is due to limited defense resources and other 
conditions both inside and outside the military. 
Qualitative elitism in the ROK Army manpower force structure should consist of 
two basic tasks: downsize the current Army manpower force structure, and specialize the 
manpower with newly acquired and available resources that can be reallocated from the 
downsizing.  Within the ROK defense community, these two tasks are known as 
“quantitative slimming and qualitative specialization of force.” 3   Manpower 
specialization, under the current conscription laws, should focus on officers and non-
commissioned officers.  Specialization of enlisted personnel in today’s ROK Army is not 
cost-effective because those in mandatory service will be discharged within 24 months. 
In line with this year’s reform plan, the ministry plans to curtail about 181,000 
Army personnel over the next 15 years, while adjusting the ratios between officers and 
non-commissioned officers to enlisted personnel from 25:75 to 40:60.  Out of the 
number, 177,000 personnel (about 97.8 percent) will be reduced from the ROK Army.   
 
                                                 
2 Young Jin Cho, Kwan Ho Cho, Kil Ho Chung, Ju Sunge Chung, Won Bae Lee, and Ahn Sik Kim, 
Defense Manpower Development Plan for an Elite Force (Seoul: Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, 
2005), 35.  
3 Ibid. 
3 
This implies that most of the manpower reform will take place among the ROK ground 
forces.  Concerning the ratio numbers from the Reform Plan, academic curiosity inspires 
a few questions:   
• How did MND figure out in the Reform Plan that 26.6 percent of current 
ROK military manpower should be reduced? 
• Why should 97.8 percent of the downsizing take place in the ROK Army? 
• Do the numbers have a solid foundation attributed to national security 
strategy, military objectives, and social, political and economical factors 
both inside and outside of the ROK military? 
• How would anyone validate the process? 
 
2. Top-Down Approach 
Since the Defense Reform will be conducted with an astronomical amount of the 
Republic of Korea’s national resources of the over the next 15 years, the ROK MND and 
its government in overall owe the Korean taxpayers answers to the above questions.  
However, the answers are not the focus of this research.  Despite such questions, it is 
crucial—for the purpose of this research—to assume that the calculations proposed by the 
MND are based on proper strategic analyses—defined as a “Top-Down” approach.  Such 
analyses can determine adequate military capabilities for the ROK Army in future 
security environments in Northeast Asia.   
A Top-Down approach is used when upper-level decision makers wish to 
visualize and articulate a new strategic plan—in this case, within the ROK military.  This 
method may be feasible for the decision makers to establish a long-term strategic plan 
such as the Reform Plan.  The actual implementation of this method, however, requires 
cooperative works among many functions within the organization, known as “Bottom-
Up” approaches.  Since this is an early, initial phase of the Reform Plan, no additional 
Bottom-Up plans are available to help visualize the actual implementation of the Reform 
Plan.   
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Therefore, this research will benchmark other advanced military organizations—
specifically the United States Army, Marine Corps, and Taiwanese Army—to review 
how they construct their manpower forces, and with what factors, to conform to their 
national security strategies.  After identifying factors that are relevant to the ROK Army, 
the research will construct a methodology of an ideal infantry battalion, the smallest 
tactical combat unit based on ROK Army doctrine.  The research will compare a ROK 
Army infantry battalion to currently standing infantry battalions from other military 
ground forces to determine what ratios an infantry battalion will require to contribute to 
the ratio of 40:60 for the entire ROK military.  If the current ratio of an infantry battalion 
does not prove effective, the research will propose ratio of commissioned officers to 
NCOs and to enlisted personnel of a future ROK infantry battalion, therefore, suggesting 
one Bottom-Up approach. 
3. Research Questions 
Primary: 
• What are the requirements and contributing factors facing its manpower 
force structure mentioned in “Defense Reform Plan 2020”? 
• How are the United States Army and United States Marine Corps infantry 
battalions currently structured? 
• What capabilities can the ROK Army infantry battalion adopt from other 
organizations to optimize its future force structure? 
 Secondary: 
• What strategic backgrounds played a role in the structuring of the United 
States Army, United States Marine Corps and Taiwanese Army infantry 
battalions?  
• What should the future force structure of the ROK Army be based  upon? 
• How has the Taiwanese Military evolved through its defense reform? 
4. Benefit of the Study 
This research is at the request of the Korean Institute of Defense Analysis (KIDA) 
and supports the Defense Reform Plan 2020.  For methodologies to determine manpower 
5 
structure or manpower management, additional studies are currently being conducted or 
planned in the Korean defense community.  This research, therefore, is timely and 
considered a valuable contribution to Defense Reform Plan 2020. 
 
B. RESEARCH METHODS 
The research is based primarily on qualitative and comparative analyses among 
the manpower force structures of four military organizations—infantry battalions of the 
ROK Army, US Army, US Marine Corps, and Taiwanese Army.  Although not inclusive, 
the sequence of the study is as follows: 
• A factors analysis of the ROK Army manpower force structure will be 
conducted to identify the requirements and contributing factors 
influencing its force structure. 
• A factors analysis of the United States Army (U.S. Army) and United 
States Marine Corps (USMC) will be conducted to identify what played a 
role in the restructuring of the two organizations’ manpower 
transformations. 
• A comparative analysis among the three military organizations will be 
conducted to identify distinct characteristics from each organization in 
order to distinguish which factors should be contributed to the ROK Army 
manpower structure. 
• A model of an ROK infantry battalion will be built based upon the 
previous factors analysis of the three military organizations to validate the 
ratio stated in the defense reform plan 2020. 
• A case study of the Taiwanese defense reform will be conducted to review 





• A general introduction of the Defense Reform Plan 2020 will be followed 
by a detailed review of the ROK Army manpower force structure, 
specifically focusing on the force ratio among officers and enlisted 
personnel. 
 
C. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
The remaining research is structured as follows: 
• Chapter II, the ROK Army Manpower Force Structure:  This chapter 
provides an overview of national and defense policies, strategies, and 
concepts of the Republic of Korea to identify the ROK Army missions.  It 
reviews the status of ROK Army manpower accessions, along with the 
current ratio of officers to NCOs and to enlisted personnel, pointing out 
the inherent limitations and ratio challenges.  In addition, the Defense 
Reform Plan 2020 of ROK MND will be discussed in line with the context 
of its manpower force structure. 
• Chapter III, Factors Analysis of the ROK Army Manpower Force 
Structure:  This chapter focuses on a factors analysis of the ROK Army 
manpower force structure to identify the contributing factors that influence 
the ROK Army manpower force structure.  By performing such analysis, 
the chapter will identify required capabilities for the ROK Army.  With 
 such capabilities identified, the chapter will sort out to find what 
capabilities are required for the future ROK Army infantry battalion. 
• Chapter IV, A Bottom-Up Approach: Infantry Battalion:  This chapter 
reviews ground force structures of the US Army, US Marine Corps and 
Taiwanese Army at battalion-level infantry units to identify capabilities 
the current ROK Army infantry battalion lacks.  A methodology of the 
ROK Army infantry battalion will be proposed based on missing required 
capabilities in the previous chapter to suggest a Bottom-Up approach.  
• Chapter V, Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations:  This 
chapter will summarizes and conclude with answer for each research 
question and recommend the areas for further research.   
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II.  THE ROK ARMY MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE 
A. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY OF THE PARTICIPATORY 
GOVERNMENT 
The global inclination toward the pursuit of harmony in the post-Cold War 
era and improved relations between the two Koreas since the June 15 
Inter-Korean summit have provided opportunities to bring “permanent 
peace” on the Korean Peninsula.  However, South Korea still confronts a 
variety of threats.  The North Korean nuclear impasse has emerged as a 
major threat to the national security of South Korea as well as a lingering 
issue hampering peace and stability in Northeast Asia region.  A 
readjustment of the U.S. forces stationed in the ROK in alignment with the 
changing global strategies of the U.S. also affects the overall security 
structure of the ROK.  Furthermore, the ROK faces new challenges of 
proactively tackling such looming security threats as transnational crimes 
including international terrorism.  
– Ministry of National Defense, 2004, 
Defense White Paper 
1. National Interest and National Security Objectives 
ROK Defense Reform Plan 2020 (the Reform Plan) for the ROK military is 
designed to implement new strategic goals and the missions.  The statement that opens 
this chapter is taken directly from the introductory overview of the National Security 
Policy Initiative of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Participatory Government4.  In order to 
overcome such challenges and threats, the Participatory Government, based on the ROC 
Constitution, has defined national interest as follows: 
• Ensuring National Security 
• Promotion of Liberal Democracy and Human Rights 
• Economic Development and Promotion of Public Welfare 
• Peaceful Unification of the Korean Peninsula  
• Contribution to World Peace and Shared Prosperity for Mankind 
Along with these national interests, the government focuses on the national 
competencies of attaining these designated national security objectives: 
                                                 
4 Each administration of the Republic of Korea has its own name other than the Republic of Korea 
Government.  The 9th Administration of Republic of Korea calls itself ‘the Participatory Government.’  The 
terms, ‘ROK Government’ and ‘Participatory Government’ are used interchangeably. 
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• Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula 
• Common Prosperity of South and North Korea, and Northeast Asia 
• Assurance of Public Safety 
Based on these national interests and security objectives, there are four principles 
of the National Security Strategy:   
• Pursuit of the Policy of Peace and Prosperity:  This principle is based 
on the spirit of the South-North Basic Agreement of 1992 and the South-
North Joint Declaration of June 15, 2000.  The purpose is to achieve stable 
inter-Korean relations based on peaceful coexistence, reconciliation, and 
cooperation.  The government is opposed to any kind of war and promotes 
 peaceful resolution of all conflicts and issues through dialogue.5   
• Conduct of Balanced and Pragmatic Diplomacy:  The objective of this 
diplomacy is to seek the development of multilateral security dialogues 
and cooperative policies, along with promotion of the ROK-US alliance, 
which constitutes the foundation of security on the Korean Peninsula.6   
• Promotion of Cooperative Self-Reliant Defense:  The ROK government 
seeks to develop capabilities and systems by which it can take the 
initiative in deterring war provocations by North Korea while promoting 
the ROK-US alliance from a future-oriented perspective, and proactively 
taking advantage of multilateral security cooperation.7   
• Development of Comprehensive Security:  Today’s national threats 
come not only from external military threats, but also from various threats 
emerging at home, and from abroad, to hinder “Public Safety.”  The 
Participatory Government works to realize an extensive concept of 
security, encompassing not only military, but also issues pertinent to 
politics, the economy, society, and the environment.8 
The Participatory Government has also established strategic tasks and basic tasks 
in accordance with the national interest, national security objectives, and the principles of 
national security strategy.  Strategic tasks are the current security issues that are essential 
                                                 
5 The Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper (Seoul: 2004), 49. 




to accomplish national security objectives.  The ROK Government set its policy priorities 
on the implementation of these tasks during its term.  Basic tasks refer to the security 
policy objectives, which serve as the foundation for the implementation of strategic tasks.  
The basic, ongoing tasks should be constantly pursued without time constraints.  The 
Participatory Government’s framework of national security strategy is shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.  The ROK National Security Strategy 
 
 
2. Basic Direction of Defense Policy 
According to the Defense White Paper 2004, the ROK military establishes and 
pursues national defense objectives and key points to accomplish the national security 
10 
goals in today’s rapidly changing security environments and defense conditions.9  The 
national defense objectives are as follows: 
• Defending the Nation from External Military Threats and Invasion:  
The first goal is “protecting the country from direct military threats from 
North Korea—including its conventional military capabilities, weapons of 
mass destruction, and forward military deployment—as well as other 
external military threats to the nation’s right to survival.”10 
• Upholding Peaceful Unification:  The ROK military strives to realize a 
peaceful unification between the South and North Koreas by deterring 
war, reducing military tension, and bringing permanent peace to the 
Korean Peninsula.11 
• Contributing to Regional Stability and World Peace:  This goal 
represents the firm determination of the ROK Government to promote 
military cooperation with neighboring nations and actively participate in 
international efforts to preserve world peace—such as UN peacekeeping 
operations.12   
To achieve the national security goals and defense objectives, the MND has 
consistently focused its effort on key defense points:   
• Establishment of a Firm Defense Posture:  The ROK military must 
sustain the military stability on the peninsula and the seas around it by 
preparing itself for any type of regular and irregular military provocation 
by North Korea or terrorist groups.  The MND must balance its effort with 
this particular defense point; the ROK defense posture also has to be a part 
of ongoing inter-Korean exchange and cooperation programs.   
The ROK Government works in conjunction with the ROK-US combined defense 
system playing a pivotal role in deterring military conflict on the Korean Peninsula.  The  
 
                                                 





ROK military relies heavily on U.S. military intelligence assets and early warning 
systems in order to monitor North Korean military movements to preclude further 
intentions of North. 
• Pursuit of Cooperative Self-Reliant Defense: The two major components 
of  the security of South Korea are “the self-reliant defense”13 and the 
ROK-US alliance.  The ROK Government firmly believes that a core 
element of its defense policy is a strategy of self-reliant defense.  The self-
reliant defense has become even more important as the ROK Government 
must prepare itself in accordance with a new strategic environment as the 
United States Forces Korea (USFK) readjusts its location, size, and role in 
South Korea.  The self-reliant defense will also be important to the ROK 
Government when today’s international environments cannot specify or 
predict who will or will not be friendly in the future.  In addition, the ROK 
military plans to establish a war executing system, centered on the ROK 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, by reorganizing the military and by strengthening the 
roles of the JCS. 
• Consistent Pursuit of Defense Reforms: The ROK military is reinforcing 
its  military efficiency and capabilities through constant self-evaluation and 
reforms.  On September 12, 2005, the Ministry of National Defense 
(MND) unveiled its reform plan, known as the “Defense Reform Plan 
2020,” for the Republic of Korea Armed Forces to build a small but strong 
military.  More information on this topic is found in Chapter II, ROK 
Army Manpower Force Structure. 
• Establishing the Image of a Trustworthy Military: If the military lacks 
full support and trust from its people, even the finest combination of elite 
soldiers and hi-tech equipment cannot guarantee a victory in war.  Several 
negative incidents undermined the image of a trustworthy military: the 
ongoing allegation of past military exemptions for a significant number of 
sons of public figures; the scandal of the general promotion board of the 
ROK  Army; the shooting rampage at a general post in DMZ; the 
                                                 
13 The Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper (Seoul: 2004), 56. 
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disappearance of an ROK Navy special operation vessel; and the 
accidental crash of ROK Air Force jet fighters in 2005.  The MND 
continues to develop and adopt a desirable military culture through 
internal reforms and commits itself to protecting and promoting safety and 
the interests of the people.  This is accomplished by providing support in 
the event of regional and national disaster management as one of its basic 
peacetime duties. 
3. Army Objectives and Missions 
The missions of the ROK Army are driven by the objectives depicted in Figure 2.  
In line with the four objectives, the core mission of the Army is to develop itself into a 
prepared, elite army that will deter war and gain victory if deterrence fails against 
eminent and potential adversaries.  A tangible term, “an elite Army,” in manpower 
perspectives, pertains to the first essential element of military power defined in Chapter I 
of this research—the human resource element.   
In order to cultivate the elite force mentioned above, an essential prerequisite is 
“the quantitative slimming and qualitative specialization of force,”14  because reform 
requires difficult programmatic and organizational choices that lead to divesting in some 
areas while investing in others.15  An intrinsic nature of any defense community under a 
democratic government includes a defense budget that has almost no margin of 
flexibility.  The only course of action is to downsize and reallocate the surplus from the 
downsizing to cultivate a better-trained and better-equipped military.  Therefore, a 
manpower force structure of the downsized ROK Army must consist of personnel who 
are better trained and more specialized to employ newly resourced military assets.  Under 
the current conscription laws, it will be most cost effective to invest more on officers and 
NCOs through qualitative specialization.  Hence, it is proper for the Reform Plan to 
anticipate an increased ratio of officers to enlisted personnel, from 25:75 to 40:60.  , 
                                                 
14 Young Jin Cho, Kwan Ho Cho, Kil Ho Chung, Ju Sunge Chung, Won Bae Lee, and Ahn Sik Kim, 
Defense Manpower Development Plan for an Elite Force (Seoul: Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, 
2005), 35. 
15 The US Department of Defense, Appendix D, Force Structure Plan: the Department of Defense 
Base Closure and Realignment (Washington D.C., the DoD, 2005), D-2. 
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questions remain, as there is no guidance on how to accomplish this task while working 
with many subordinate ROK Army units with various sizes and missions. 
• Cultivate an Elite Force:  Future objectives can be achieved only when 
the ROK Army cultivates itself to become an elite force.  Therefore, this 
objective must be a prerequisite for the following three: 
• Deterring War:  The ROK Army, as the main force of national defense, 
contributes its service to deter wars.   
• Gain Victory on Ground Warfare:  The North Korean military today 
maintains an approximate 1,000,000-strong army force and 100,000 
special operations forces.  Therefore, the ROK Army believes that any 
kind of war should ultimately be resolved by the ground component of the 
military. 
• Support the Safety and Interests of Korean People:  This objective is 
based on the fourth key defense point set by the MND.  A peacetime 
mission of the ROK Army is to provide safety, to support Korean citizens’ 
interests, and to establish “the image of a trustworthy military.” 
 
B. DEFENSE REFORM PLAN 2020 
As noted in Chapter I, the ROK MND introduced Defense Reform Plan 2020 in 
September 2005.  In anticipation of building a smaller but stronger military, the Republic 
of Korea has worked to transform its military through modernizations for many years.  
The story goes back to the 1970s when President Jung-Hee Park asserted that the 
Republic of Korea must meet the conditions of a true, self-reliant, national defense.  The 
public sentiment is in favor of a defense reform because the current defense systems have 
been in place for a half century, and they must be closely reviewed to develop the ROK 
military into an organization more capable of executing modern warfare.  Throughout 
past administrations, many efforts were made in vain, failing for various reasons both 
inside and outside the ROK military.  Last year’s Defense Reform Plan 2020 (by the 
MND of the Participatory Government) has gained general support, so far, from the 
opposition party as well as from the majority of the Korean population.  Many obstacles 
remain to be overcome; one of them is a reform in the ROK military manpower force 
14 
structure.  By definition, from the Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA), there are four 
essential elements in the concept of RMA: new technology, new weapons systems, new 
operations concepts, and a new force structure.  If the force structure does not evolve 
with other elements of the RMA, not only do the other three elements fail to function 



















Figure 2.  The ROK Army Missions 
 
1. Background 
The MND foresees, near the year 2020, defense environments as follows: 
• Worldwide: The United States will maintain its initiatives formulating 
world orders.  Whereas a possibility of all-out war will decrease, regional 
conflicts will continue and supra-national threats will increase. 
• Northeast Asia: Despite increased inter-dependability among neighboring 
nations, the possibility of instability will continue because of the 
permanent issues of regional conflicts.  Therefore, nations in the area will 
continue to increase their military capabilities. 
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• The Korean Peninsula: The Republic of Korea will surface as one of the 
main actors in Northeast Asia, whereas North Korea will fall far behind 
the South.  As the ROK-US alliance continues to develop, the role of the 
ROK military will expand. 
In summary, the MND predicts that, as the military threat of North Korea 
gradually decreases, non-military and supra-national threats in Northeast Asia will grow.  
Therefore, in order to proactively offset any potential threats in the region, the MND 
believes it is imperative for the Republic of Korea to understand the comprehensive 
security concept and act upon the dynamic security environments in the region. 17  
However, the current ROK defense systems possess several, post-modern military 
predicaments that have been passed down for more than 50 years, hindering the nation 
from taking active roles in the region:   
• First, the ROK military has maintained a mostly army-centered and 
personnel-dependent organization, based on the eminent threat of North 
Korea, which maintains a vast army-oriented military.  This inherent 
strategic military culture resulted in an unbalanced defense development 
among the three service branches and, therefore, limited the ability to 
develop joint capabilities.  Such personnel dependency will cause the 
ROK military unfit for the future battlefields due to a fact that future 
battlefields will require well-trained and specialized personnel within 
flexible force structures to operate highly digitized and mechanized 
military assets in various scenarios of unpredictable security 
environments.  This problem suggests that, despite the ROK military’s 
desire to play an expanded role within unpredictable security 
environments in the future, its current force structures are not based on a 
mindset of capabilities-based planning.  The existence of such a dilemma 
is easily observed when knowing that no MND document was published—
prior to the Reform Plan—to suggest adequate capabilities of the ROK 
military in the future.  The main theme of this research is highly related to 
                                                 
17 The ROK Ministry of National Defense, The Defense Reform Plan 2020 (Seoul, The MND, 2005), 
5. 
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this dilemma, because force structure planning must be based on a solid, 
strategic vision of future capabilities of the ROK military.  Section 2 of 
this chapter will discuss more on this issue. 
• Second, there is an overall ineffectiveness in the ROK defense systems 
because of a lack of successful reform in defense management.  In 
addition, despite such limited defense resources that have little margin of 
flexibility, the demand for the military to support the safety and interests 
of the people, and the welfare of soldiers, continues to grow.   
• Third, the ROK military must agree that the combined defense posture of 
the ROK-US is not well balanced.  The ROK military has not been able to 
develop strategic and military doctrines suited for its own defense 
environment on the Korean Peninsula.  This has resulted in limited 
capabilities in operation planning and execution, and a heavy dependency 
on the U.S. military for its national defense.  Such consistent dependency 
on the U.S. ally must not be interpreted as cooperation, and it will not 
guarantee the expanded role of South Korea in the Northeast Asia region.   
• Fourth, the twenty-first century battlefield demands the continuous 
development of information and scientific technologies in the military.  
Long-range and high-precision weaponry has broadened today’s 
battleground.  On the other hand, the network centric warfare (NCW) is 
increasingly gaining more importance than ever.  The trends of modern 
warfare require the ROK military to cultivate proper capabilities suited for 
the twenty-first century battlefield. 
• Fifth, the MND has set four major emphases for the Reform Plan as 
depicted in Figure 3.18  The first emphasis mainly pertains to this research 
and is discussed in this chapter.  The second emphasis is on civil control 
of the ROK defense community, allowing the military to concentrate 
solely on its inherent purpose—fighting wars.  According to the Reform 
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Transforming into Effective Defense System 
Through Overall Defense Upgrade
Structuring Military Suited for Modern Warfare1
Increase Civil Employment2
Improve Quality of Life4
Cost Effective Defense Management System3
Plan, the current defense civilian employment cap in the MND will be 
increased from 52% to 71% by the end of 2009.  The third emphasis is 
mainly concerned with the cost effectiveness of the ROK defense 
management systems.  With scarce defense resources, it is imperative for 
the MND to devise cost-effective defense management systems.   
• Lastly, the ROK Army refers to itself as “the People’s Army.”  All Korean 
males over the age of 18 years are required to serve in the military, as 
most of them do.  After 24 months of service (or 26 months for the Navy 
and 28 months for the Air Force), they return to society where they will 
compose the majority of male citizens of the Korean population.  For this 
reason, the Army is impartibly connected to the people—especially as 
their young sons are, or will serve in the Army.  Therefore, improving the 
welfare of soldiers, up to their minimum standards, must not be 












   
Figure 3.  Major Focus of the Defense Reform 
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2. Current Army Manpower Force Structure 
a. Threat-Based Force Structure Planning 
The military strengths between South and North Korea are illustrated in 
Table 1.19  The current size and structure of the ROK military is unfit to the MND’s 
future prospects of defense environments.  This is true because the current ROK military 
force structures are founded on a threat-based concept on the assumption that the North 
Korean military will be the only threat to South Korean national securities in the future.  
This, in fact, has been updated in the Reform Plan.  The eminent threat from North Korea 
will gradually decrease while the possibility of instability in Northeast Asia will continue 
due to the permanent issues of regional conflicts.  Hence, nations in the region will 
continue to increase their military capabilities.20  If the ROK Government truly foresees 
itself as playing an expanded role in Northeast Asia, its mindset should no longer be fixed 
on such threat-based planning. 
This does not imply, however, that the eminent threat from North Korea 
should be disregarded in future force structure planning.  Therefore, it is a challenge for 
the ROK military to maintain current military competency against North Korea, while 
shifting its main objective of transforming into a military suited for future defense 
environments.  This is the dilemma of current ROK MND, introduced earlier in this 
chapter.  The only solution seems to be a defense reform of ROK military into armed 
forces capable of accomplishing both challenges.  
Concerning the current quantitative advantage of the North Korean 
military, there must be qualitative and core military capabilities to offset threats from 
such adversaries on modern battlefields.  Instead of maintaining a personnel-intense 
military, the ROK Armed forces will have to overcome the quantitatively immense North 
Korean military by its qualitative advantages—flexible capabilities generated from an 
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b. Manpower Ratios within the Current ROK Army 
The ROK Army manpower force structure is simply defined as “an 
excessively personnel centric structure.”21  The manpower force structure of the ROK 
Army, by far, remains personnel intense, because the threat from North Korea mainly 
consists of its vast army of more than 1,000,000 personnel.  Additionally, the ROK 
accession system heavily depends on the nation’s compulsory military service 
requirement.  The ROK military has never had a problem filling recruiting quotas like the 
US military is currently experiencing.   
                                                 
21 Chung Je Park, “The Direction of ROK Military Defense Reform,” Korea Defense Review, 
(September 2005), 84. 
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Current ROK officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and enlisted 
personnel ratios for each branch of service are illustrated in Table 222.  The aggregate 
ratio between officers and NCOs to enlisted personnel is 25:75.  The Army ratio of 
officers is further reduced to 20%, increasing the percentage of enlisted personnel to 
80%.  The Reform Plan does not specify the number of NCOs or its percentage in the 
officer ratio.  The duties and responsibilities of officers and NCOs are clearly different 
and the ROK military maintains distinctively different personnel systems (including 
accession, training, promotion, compensation, and personnel management separately 
between commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers.  Therefore, the current 
ratio of 20% of the officers must be divided into at least two groups: officers (including 
warrant officers) and NCOs, (if not three groups, for officers, warrant officers, and 
NCOs).  In this research, the current ratio of 20:80 between officers to enlisted personnel 
will be re-categorized into the ratio of officers (including warrant officers) to NCOs and 
to enlisted personnel of the ROK Army, which is 9:11:80.  It should be noted that the 
ratios have been rounded from actual numbers of 8.7:11.3:80.23  In addition, another 
distinction must be made between enlisted personnel and NCOs.  Normally, when one 
refers to an enlisted man in the ROK Army, he is between E-1 and E-4.  These personnel 
are strictly those who serve in the ROK Army for 24 months to fulfill their obligations of 
the Conscription.  Therefore, those with the rank of E-5 and above are NCOs in the ROK 
Army.  However, this rank system only applies to the ROK military, and the research 
clarifies the different rank systems of NCOs among different militaries in Chapter IV. 
The 9:11:80 ratios among officers, NCOs, and enlisted personnel of the 
ROK Army clearly show that the current ROK Army manpower structure depends 
excessively upon the enlisted group whose turnover rate, by nature of the conscription 
law, is very high.  Currently, an Army enlisted man serves for 24 months and is then 
discharged to become a reservist for the next seven years.  To structure the ROK Army 
into a technology-oriented force, a significant amount of manpower training and 
education will be needed to employ the newly resourced military assets.  
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c. Capabilities-Based Force Structure Planning 
The Reform Plan objective and direction for military force structure—to 
be accomplished by the end of 2020—is as follows: 
• Objective:  Transform the ROK military from the quantitative pre-modern 
structure of personnel intensity into a qualitative technology-oriented 
structure. 
• Direction:   
o Reform the current military into one suitable to perform future 
warfare while maintaining the military readiness against the North. 
o Gradual specialization of manpower, linking knowledge and ability 
with hi-tech weapons systems.24 
 
Reform for future warfare while maintaining 
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Figure 4. Manpower Reform in Defense Reform Plan 2020 
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The objective and directions of the Reform Plan are shown in Figure 4.25  
As noted in Chapter I, the direction of the Defense Reform has specifically identified the 
two essential elements of a military power: the physical resource elements and the human 
resource elements.  If a military power is to be maximized, these two elements must be 
cultivated in a reciprocal and synergistic manner.  In other words, to transform a military 
that has been very personnel dependent in the past, into one equipped with future 
technologies and information science, “qualitative elitism”26 in a military manpower 
force structure is an essential prerequisite. 
Capabilities-based planning of the ROK Army force structure must start 
from this framework.  It does not focus on specific conflicts with fixed adversaries.  The 
United States Department of Defense clearly provides guidance on how capabilities-
based planning starts from a framework that “helps determine capabilities required for a 
range of scenarios.”  Then, the MND must analyze “the force requirements for the most 
likely, the most dangerous, and the most demanding circumstances.”27  When the MND 
unveiled its defense reform plan, it must have conducted a strategic approach based on 
future capabilities of the ROK military.   
3. Defense Reform Plan 2020 Structure 
As introduced in Chapter I, the MND plans to reduce ROK military force 
structure by about 181,000 personnel (as depicted in the right half of Figure 428) over the 
next 15 years.  While doing so the MND plans to adjust the officers to enlisted personnel 
or the 181,000 to be cut from about 25:75 to 40:60.29  The Army expects approximately 
177,000 (97.8 percent) of the 181,000 to be cut.  The reduction is being accomplished by 
reducing middle and upper level units. For example, by the year 2020, the Reform Plan 
anticipates cutting one out of three field armies, four out of 10 corps and 27 out of 47 
                                                 
25 The ROK Ministry of National Defense, The Defense Reform Plan 2020 (Seoul, The MND, 2005), 
34-37. 
26 Young Jin, Cho, Kwan Ho Cho, Kil Ho Chung, Ju Sunge Chung, Won Bae Lee, and Ahn Sik Kim, 
Defense Manpower Development Plan for an Elite Force (Seoul: Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, 
2005), 35.  
27 The US Department of Defense, Appendix D, Force Structure Plan: the Department of Defense 
Base Closure and Realignment (Washington D.C., the DoD, 2005), D-1. 
28 The ROK Ministry of National Defense, The Defense Reform Plan 2020 (Seoul, The MND, 2005), 
34-37 
29 Ibid., 16. 
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divisions in the ROK Army.30  The Military Structure Task Force, under the MND, 
calculated the 40:60 ratio through a Top-Down approach.  This approach was chosen 
because of the upper-level decision makers’ visualization and articulation of the new 
strategic plan for their organization.  However, the actual implementation of this high-
level plan requires detailed works performed by many functions within the organization.  
For instance, in order to realize the long-term targeted ratio between officers and enlisted 
personnel, manpower planners must develop a force structure that conforms to the 40:60.  
Challenges exist due to numerous organic units within the organization that must be 
reorganized along the chain of command.  Because targeted ratios must be equal to the 
aggregated sum of manpower ratios from each unit to contribute to the strategic objective 
of the ROK Military.  Additionally, the planners must understand this is a multi-faceted 
task.  Other aspects, such as Tables of Organizations and Equipments (TO&Es), the 
defense budget, accession systems, and manpower management, must be reviewed in 
conjunction with the manpower force structure changes. 
Unlike the US Army, which uses the ratio of enlisted personnel to commissioned 
and warrant officers known as the “E:O Ratio,” 31  the ROK Defense Manpower 
community uses either a ratio of officers (including warrant officers) to NCOs and to 
enlisted personnel, or a ratio of officers (including warrant officers and NCOs) to enlisted 
personnel.  In order to be consistent throughout the research, the former case will be used 
(the ratio of officers to NCOs and to enlisted personnel). 
4. Limitations and Challenges  
A comparative illustration of the ratios of officers, NCOs, and enlisted personnel 
of the ROK Army to other armies in advanced foreign militaries is shown in Table 332.  
These countries do not maintain their militaries on conscription-based accessions 
systems, and have different economic capabilities, cultures, and rank systems.  Therefore, 
a definite comparison may not be feasible.  It is nevertheless meaningful to analyze, in 
                                                 
30 Kwan Ho Cho, “Direction of Manpower Structures Development for a Successful Defense 
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<http://www.ausa.org/webpub/DeptArmyMagazine.nsf/byid/CCRN-6CCSBW> 
32 Kwan Ho Cho, “Direction of Manpower Structures Development for a Successful Defense 
Reform,” Weekly Defense Journal, (January 2006). 
24 
order to establish a future direction of the ROK Army in its manpower force structures.  
There are three distinct differences between the ROK military and others as follows: 
• In general, the ratio of officers (commissioned warrant and non-
commissioned combined) to the rest of the armies is between 50% and 
60%, while the ROK Army currently maintains only 20%. 
• The ROK Army maintains about 9% (rounded up from 8.7) commissioned 
officers, whereas other armies maintain their officer corps between 10% 
and 14%. 
• A difference becomes even more notable in the ratios of NCOs.  Other 
advanced armies maintain between 36% and 48% of NCOs, while only 
about 11% (rounded down from 11.3) of the entire ROK Army is 
comprised of NCOs. 
 

























The United States of officer ratios (commissioned, warrant, and non-
commissioned combined) increased from 47% in the 1980s to 56 percent in the 2000s.  
25 
This trend was also observed in the German military where the ratio in 1997 was 55 
percent, and will increase to 63 percent.33  From comparative analyses, future ROK 
military manpower force structures must be officer-centered, focusing mainly on 
increasing the ratio of NCOs in places currently held by commissioned officers and 
enlisted personnel.  Research shows that today’s advanced international militaries 
maintain higher percentages of trained NCOs in order to execute a technology-oriented 
military force on the twenty-first century battlefield.  In order to give a numerical 
magnitude of this difference, Table 4 is presented as a comparison of manpower strengths 
of the ROK Army and the most current manpower strength of the U.S. ground forces in 
Fiscal Year 2005—in numbers and ratios with the ROK Army as the base case.   
 










Challenges to be overcome using the Top-Down approach are: 
• The targeted ratio of 40:60 between officers and enlisted personnel 
mentioned in the Defense Reform do not clearly indicate how the officer 
ratio of 40 percent will be divided between commissioned officers and 
NCOs. 
• The actual implementation of this method requires an aggregate 
manpower force structure plan of many units within the ROK Army, 
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known as Bottom-Up approaches.  Therefore, a real challenge lies ahead  
 
for the ROK Army: conducting necessary Bottom-Up approaches that will 
finalize an overall manpower force structure through staffing of individual 
units within the ROK Army. 
• In order to man and equip a unit, an adequate capability of the unit must 
be defined as a prerequisite.  A future ROK Army unit must be in parallel 
with the Army objective and missions incorporated into the Defense 
Reform objectives and directions which are: 
o Transform the Army into a qualitative technology–oriented 
structure. 
o Reform the current Army, to make it suitable to perform future 
warfare, while maintaining the military readiness against the 
North. 
o Gradual specialization of manpower, linked with the actualizing of 
hi-tech weapon systems34. 
In summary, the smaller ROK Army, through its qualitative elitism and 
modernization, must be flexible to properly deter the eminent threat from North Korea in 
conjunction with prepared capabilities against unspecific threats around the Korean 
Peninsula.   
 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter reviewed the current ROK Army manpower force structure and 
showed that the ROK Army maintains, “an excessively personnel centric 
structure”35mainly focused on enlisted personnel.  With the current manpower ratios of 
9:11:80 among commissioned officers, NCOs, and enlisted personnel, it has been clearly 
proven that the current ROK Army lacks an adequate manpower force structure 
demanded for twenty-first century battlefields.  The right mix of human resources—
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comprising the proper skills, education, and training—are crucial to execute missions in a 
new, technology-oriented armed force.  In order to develop the ROK Army into such an 
armed force, it must increase the percentage of commissioned officers and NCOs, and it 
must put significantly more weight on the ROK NCO Corps. 
The research also showed that a smaller but stronger army involves more than 
simply cutting down its size and introducing new weaponry; it is a multi-faced task where 
several factors must be reviewed from different angles.  When establishing a broad future 
direction of the ROK Army manpower force structure, a Top-Down approach, as 
introduced in the Defense Reform Plan 2020is but must be followed by numerous 
Bottom-Up approaches that conform with Top-Down planning.  To accomplish these 
tasks, a capabilities-based structural planning, that provides flexibility in order to deter 
the current North Korean threat while preparing itself for unspecified threats in Northeast 
Asia.  Additionally, the chapter also pointed out that the ROK Army should not 
underestimate the threat from North Korea.  The current ROK MND dilemma must be 
resolved through the Reform Plan by transforming the ROK military into armed forces 
capable of accomplishing both challenges: current threats and potential future threats.  In 
the next chapter, the research will conduct a factors analysis of the ROK Army to see 
which factors must be reviewed when determining such capabilities for the future ROK 
Army, and why these numbers should represent an adequate ratio of the future ROK 
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III. ROK ARMY MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE FACTORS 
ANALYSIS 
A. BACKGROUND 
Building a military organization and its force structure is a comprehensive, multi-
faceted process.  As mentioned in Chapter II, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) 
has at least four required elements: new technology, weapon systems, concept of 
operation, and force structure.  These elements synergize to create a change in a 
military’s capability.  Since there are no factors identified in the Defense Reform Plan 
2020 (the Reform Plan), this chapter will identify factors that will contribute to the future 
Republic of Korea (ROK) Army manpower force structure.  This analysis will estimate 
the type and size of capabilities the ROK Army should possess in accordance with 
various internal and external factors.  ROK Army manpower planners must identify 
specific equipment, manpower strength, and its ratios among officers, non-commissioned 
officers (NCOs), and enlisted personnel for each organic unit of the ROK Army, and then 
finalize the ROK Army manpower force structure.  Prior to conducting an ROK infantry 
battalion Bottom-Up review, required capabilities must be identified.  This will be 
accomplished through a comparative analysis of several infantry battalions of different 
ground forces. 
1. ROK Army Force Structure Factors 
The allocation and planning of scarce defense resources is a complicated process 
that involves many factors that directly and indirectly affect national security.  According 
to Lloyd, strategy and force structure are rationales for force planning.  In his view, a 
force structure can be most effective when it is continuously reviewed, revised, and 
practiced against national security strategy and military strategy.36  In the ROK Army, 
various factors and characteristics are found, and these are subject to continuous reviews 
during and after the development of its manpower force structure: 
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a. Military Threat 
(1) The Eminent Threat.  Even after the inter-Korean summit in 
June 2000, North Korea maintained its military unchanged.  This is mainly due to the 
Songun Chongch’I (translated into “Military First”) policy, which is in essence a “politics 
which solves all problems arising in the revolution and construction on the principle of 
giving priority to the military affair and advances the overall cause of socialism relying 
on the army as the pillar of the revolution."37   The Military First policy has been 
attaching greater weight to the political role of the military.  Based on this policy, North 
Korea continues to maintain its conventional and asymmetrical military capabilities, with 
increasing focus on the latter.  Against its eminent adversary, the ROK military has 
identified five major military threats from North Korea:  
• Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weaponry: Even though there is 
no solid evidence indicating North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, it is 
suspected that North Korea may have produced one or two nuclear 
weapons with about 10 to 14 Kg of weapons-grade plutonium. 38  
However, there are several confirmed chemical factories producing 
various toxic agents in the North as well as separate storage facilities at 
different locations.  This situation leads to a conclusion that approximately 
2,500 to 5,000 tons of toxic agents have been produced and stored for use.  
When these NBC assets are combined with the mid/long-range missiles or 
long-range artilleries, North Korea can pose a great threat of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD) against the Northeast Asian region, including 
the ROK Government.   
• Long-range Artilleries:  The Seoul Metropolitan Area of the ROK is 
within the range of 170mm self-propelled artillery tubes and 240mm 
multiple rocket launchers deployed in the forward area.  Most of them 
have already been in fixed positions in numerous tunnels and have zeroed 
in on their targets.  During the first nuclear crisis in the early 1990s, North 
                                                 
37 “Songun Chonch’i,” Global Security http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/songun-
chongchi.htm (Last accessed 02/17/06) 
38 The Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper (Seoul: 2004), 44. 
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Korea warned that it would turn the ROK capital of Seoul into a “sea of 
fire” if the U.S. and ROK continued to provoke and condemn the North 
for nuclear development.  The ROK assumes the North Korean warning 
had its basis in the firepower of long-range artilleries.  They would be a 
major means of attack during the initial phase of a possible future war 
scenario.   
• Special Operation Forces (SOF):  North Korea maintains more than 
100,000 SOF units trained for deployment into South Korea prior to and 
during the initial phase of war.  They would be deployed via various 
infiltration routes to derange the ROK rear area by sabotaging war support 
facilities and assassinating the ROK leadership. 
• Armored Assets: North Korea is assumed to maintain about 5,800 tanks 
and armored vehicles.  In order for the North to speed up and end its war 
efforts before the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration 
(RSO & I) of the US military into war, these assets would be deployed 
during the early phase of war. 
• Air Assets:  There are about 1,380 fixed-wing aircraft owned by the North 
Korean Air Force, including jet fighters and support aircrafts.  They would 
be deployed during the early phase of war for the same reason as 
mentioned above on the North Korean armored assets.   
It is notable that three of the five North Korean threats are directed 
from its ground forces: long-range artilleries, SOF, and armored assets.  Since the 
eminent threat maintains a huge ground force, the ROK military must also maintain 
capabilities to balance against them.  Based on the five major military threats of North 
Korea, counter measuring capabilities, currently limited or lacked in the ROK Army, are 
summarized in Table 4.  The current situation on the Korean Peninsula is quite different 
from one the United States faced after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.  
The threat from North Korea still exists today; therefore, the ROK Army must include 
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this threat analysis in its capabilities-based planning, while identifying other capabilities 
suited for the future security environments. 
Table 5.  The North Korean Threats and the ROK Counter Measures 
 
- ROK-US combined air assets
- Enhanced lower unit level anti-air 
capabilities required
- Mostly obsolete equipments
- Logistic insufficiencyAir Assets 
- ROK-US Aviation Assets
- Enhanced lower unit level anti-
amor capabilities required
- Mostly obsolete equipments 
- Logistic insufficiency
- Limited line of communications
Armored Assets 
- Counter infiltration operations
- Homeland Defense Reserve Force
- Enhanced lower unit level
maneuverability required
- Enhanced lower unit level anti-
air capabilities required
- Lightly equipped
- Limited infiltration methods
- No line of communications
- Dystrophy of the troops
Special Operation Forces (SOF) 
- Counter Fire Assets:
AN/TPQ-36 & 37 and K-9
- Multi Launching Rocket Systems
(MLRS)
- ROK-US Combined Air Assets:
F-15, F-117 and B-2
- Joint Direct Attack Munitions
(JDAM)
- Guided Bomb Unit (GBU) – 28:
Bunker Busters
- Low fire rates (30 minutes for
reloading)
Long-range Artilleries 
- Non Applicable for the ROK Army:
Precision attacks: F-15, B-2 and
Joint Direct Attack Munitions
(JDAM) by ROK-US Combined
Operations
- Locations already identifiedNuclear, biological and chemical 
(NBC) weaponry 
Limited or Lacking 
Capabilities in the ROK ArmyLimitation and WeaknessThe North Korea Threats
 
 
According to the summarized table above, the ROK Army must 
enhance its lower ground units with: 
• Counter NBC capabilities: For example, a ROK infantry battalion is 
inherently vulnerable against an enemy’s tactical biological and chemical 
attacks in a sense of limited decontamination equipments, other than basic 
NBC protection capabilities.  Also, there is no specified officer who is in 
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charge of NBC protection training against a North Korean NBC attack.  
Currently, such training is conducted by each company’s NCOs through 
“Soldier’s Basic Training Curriculum” in accordance with the battalion’s 
annual training schedules.  Also, there is an appointed officer or NCO, by 
the battalion commander’s discretion—not by the Table of Organization 
and Equipments (TOE) that is sent to a corps level NBC training each 
quarter to train his/her own units and advise the commander during such 
an attack.  However, such training on unauthorized personnel only hinders 
his/her original duty performance. 
• Counter SOF capabilities: In addition to the 100,000 SOF personnel for 
strategic missions, there are light infantry companies and scout platoons 
organized under North Korean infantry regiments and battalions whose 
main missions is to attack command posts and neutralize combat service 
support capabilities.  A ROK infantry battalion lacks counter measure 
against such enemy attacks. 
• Anti-armor capabilities:  Currently anti-armor assets under a ROK infantry 
regiment is a 106 mm Recoilless Rifle platoon and a 90mm Recoilless 
Platoon under the Weapons Company in each battalion of the regiment.  
These obsolete anti-tank weapons may be effective against North Korean 
T-60 and T-70 series tanks in a close range, but not against T-80 and later 
versions.  The ROK Army also maintains a Tube-launched, Optically 
tracked, Wire-guided missile (TOW) company that is employed 
throughout lower units in forms of general support, direct support and 
attachment.  However, in addition to the fact that TOW is already an aging 
anti-tank weapon system, one company under divisional control does not 
provide flexible anti-armor capabilities as required for future warfare. 
• Anti-air capabilities:  A ROK Army division maintains one air defense 
company that is designed to provide the division with an air-defense.  
Lower units lack flexible anti-air capabilities, therefore are vulnerable 
against enemy air assets. 
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(2) Capabilities against Potential and Unspecified Threats.  
According to Asch and Hosek, the ROK military will need to shift itself from Threat-
Based to Capabilities-Based planning39 in the future.  Since South Korea also foresees 
itself as becoming an active player in the North East Asian region, its military must 
comprehend the dynamic security environment in the region, and therefore, redefine its 
role in the nation’s national security strategy.  The ROK Army has to broaden its view 
and take long-term, national security objectives into account.  This means the ROK Army 
must build a security framework that includes neighboring militaries such as Chinese, 
Japanese, and Russian armed forces as future potential threats.  This is especially 
important because, when a force structure is built and based solely on a set of specified 
threats—and the assumption that if certain threats could be met other threats can be met, 
in this case North Korea—inflexible characteristics of the manpower force structure will 
hinder the Army.  It will be unable to realize the fourth national security strategy, 
“Development of Comprehensive Security.”   
A solution to such fixed threat based force planning is to give the 
structure enough flexibility to offset unspecified threats in the future through capabilities-
based planning.  A direction to accomplish this task is described in the objective and 
directions of the Reform Plan, as introduced in Chapter II.  It is to “transform the ROK 
military from the quantitative pre-modern structure of personnel intensity into a 
qualitative technology-oriented structure” by “reforming the current military into one 
suitable to future warfare,” and “specializing manpower, linking with actualizing of hi-
tech weapons systems.”40  Such objective and directions will be visualized throughout 
lower units as they acquire more capabilities to flexibly offset uncertain threats that the 
ROK Army cannot anticipate from North Korea.  The second direction suggests that 
flexibility from more capabilities does not necessarily imply a bigger Army, but 
specializing selected manpower to realize future technologies in military capabilities. 
 
 
                                                 
39 Beth Asch and James R. Hosek, Looking to the Future: What Does Transformation Mean for 
Military Manpower and Personnel Policy? (Occasional Paper Series RAND, 2004), 4.  
40 The ROK Ministry of National Defense, The Defense Reform Plan 2020 (Seoul, The MND, 2005), 
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b. Military Strategy 
The ROK military strategy stems from national interests.  Because the 
eminent and constant military threat of North Korea may undermine the national interests 
of the ROK Government, a military strategy must support the national interests by 
upholding the national security objectives.  As introduced in Chapter II—The ROK Army 
Manpower Force Structure—the ROK Army missions support the Basic Direction of the 
ROK Defense Policy based on National Security Objectives.  The ROK Army exists to 
deter war, to gain victory on ground warfare, and to support the safety and interests of its 
people by building an elite force.   
Taken from the rationale called the Army Objectives, the ROK military 
strategy should provide a roadmap to realize the objectives.  Therefore, the strategy must 
consist of specific, military goals that incorporate tangible means, such as the human and 
physical resource elements, which help to define the strategic capability of the ROK 
Army.  A force structure becomes relevant when the human resource element is included 
in the military strategy.  Therefore, it is the military strategy that decides the size and 
shape of the human resource elements as part of the force structure in order to achieve the 
military objective.  Combined with the physical resource elements based on the military 
strategy, the ROK Army manpower force structure is specified and visualized through 
different tables of organization and equipment for different military units throughout the 
chain of command. 
According to the ROK-US combined defense operation plan constructed 
upon an invasive war scenario of North Korea, the ROK military strategy is characterized 
as defensive during the initial phase of war, becoming counter-offensive after conducting 
successful, defensive operations.  Such strategic characteristic allows the ROK Army to 
remain as the main military component of the ROK military.  This point will appear again 
in the Strategic Culture in History section.   
In the common tactical mind of a tactician, a defensive war is waged at a 
prepared position with geographical advantages to the defender that does not necessarily 
have to maneuver around.  Based on this thought, two points deserve attention.   
• Based on Table 1, these advantages are visualized in comparative force 
ratios in personnel between the offender and the defender as 3 to 1.  The 
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current Army personnel ratio, between the ROK and North Korea, is about 
1:1.8, leading to a hasty conclusion that the ROK military is at a great 
disadvantage during counter-offensive operations.  However, this rational 
cannot solely dictate ROK Army manpower force planning; the physical 
resource elements are not accounted for in this comparison.  Even when 
counter offensive operations are conducted after the second half of the 
ROK defensive operations plan—where the ROK will need, 
comparatively at least, a triple-sized force to gain victory—the 
technological advantages of the ROK military should offset the 
quantitative disadvantages. 
• The advantage of less requirement of maneuvering has become one of the 
reasons why the ROK Army does not necessarily have to mechanize its 
units while, on the other hand, giving a good reason to remain oversized.  
Such a defensive advantage has to be closely reviewed because defenders 
with more maneuverability will secure more initiative.  Also, the second 
half of the ROK-US combined defense operations plan is counter-
offensive operations where maneuverability is essential to gain operational 
initiative and tempo.  Therefore, the ROK Army will have to acquire more 
independent maneuverability and operational sustainability for lower units 
in order to gain more flexible capabilities. 
c. Geography 
Depending on where a war is fought, an emphasis of military strategy can 
shift from one to another.  This is due to the geographical characteristic of the battlefield 
which  is another determinant that consequently affects military manpower force planners.  
The battlefield for the ROK Army, on a war scenario on the Korean Peninsula, is 
characterized as rugged, mountainous terrain; more than 70% of ROK territory is 
mountains.  This means that, despite the well-developed road networks throughout the 
country, the ROK Army must develop its foot infantry units suited for mountainous areas 




d. Strategic Culture in History 
To capture a historical sense of strategic culture, it is meaningful to look at 
a history of Korea and to identify another factor in the current ROK Army manpower 
force structure.  Historically, because of the geopolitical importance of the Korean 
Peninsula, Korea has been invaded by neighboring powers on numerous occasions.  
However, there is no historical record suggesting a Korean invasion against its 
neighboring countries—except for a handful of expeditionary campaigns in Japan and on 
Manchurian land.  Such strategic culture, along with the U.S. strategic interests in the 
region, have historically restrained the ROK military from taking preemptive measures. 
This characterizes the ROK military as best suited for defensive operations.  Throughout 
history, and even today, the Korean military does not exhibit itself as a projecting power.  
This historically strategic culture is imbedded in the ROK Constitution and is specified as 
the first national security objective: Pursuit of the Policy of Peace and Prosperity.  It is 
inherently perceptible when a defensive posture is emphasized in the military that it is its 
army that is emphasized and cultivated.  On the other hand, when a nation maintains a 
projecting military strategy, its navy and air force comparatively gain more weight due to 
the innate nature of the service branches.  Therefore, historically, the Korean military has 
mainly identified itself as a ground battle force.  This is why more than 80 percent of the 
ROK military is Army, and why most defense ministers and chairmen of ROK Joint 
Chief of Staff have Army backgrounds.  This fact is also one of the main reasons 97.7 
percent of the downsizing in the Defense Reform will occur in the Army, compared to 
reductions of only 0.3 percent in the ROK Navy and no change in the ROK Air Force.  
This Army-centered, strategic culture will not change much in the near future. 
e. Technological Capabilities 
Technology in the military is another factor in the ROK Army manpower 
force structure.  Technology, by nature, can downsize the traditional ROK Army by 
introducing new command and control capabilities and hi-tech weapons systems.  This is 
based on the reasoning that qualitative, technological advantages will offset the 
quantitative disadvantages, and is one of the main reasons behind the “qualitative 
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slimming and the qualitative specialization.”41  South Korea has put much effort into 
developing its military into a technology-oriented armed force.  Throughout the Defense 
Reform, the ROK MND’s intention to make qualitative changes is laid out accordingly.  
Stated in the ROK Defense White Paper 2004, the ROK military intends to consolidate 
the foundation of its research and development (R&D) and defense industry.  South 
Korea currently ranks about the tenth in the world in terms of the technological ability to 
develop advanced weaponry,42 yielding a persuasive reason for military R&D.  With the 
current manpower force structure and upcoming technological renovations at hand, a 
planner of the ROK Army manpower force structure should anticipate force requirements 
that will be required to properly employ new technologies and science in the Army. 
f. Economy: Defense Budget 
Like any other military organization under a democratic government, the 
ROK Army is sustained by the defense budgets appropriated by the congress.  Potential 
impacts of defense budgets on manpower force structure may vary, but undoubtedly, if 
too little is budgeted for a significant period of time, the scales of a military organization 
will be influenced.  Generally, two major programs are included in ROK military defense 
budgets: Force Investments Programs (FIP) and Ordinary Operational Costs (OOC).  FIP 
aims “to secure capabilities to tackle existing threats first and subsequently to brace for 
unspecified future threats, strengthening domestic R&D capabilities at the same time.”43  
Also, ordinary operational expenses focus primarily on improving the soldier’s quality of 
life, digitizing national defense systems, consolidating education and training, and 
maintaining existing combat forces.  Table 644 illustrates the amount and functional 
allocation of the general accounts of the FY 2005 defense budget.  The allocation for the 
FIP totaled 7.0656 trillion wons, up 12.3 percent from FY 2004.  The FIP allotments 
reflect the annual financial requirements to secure main combat capabilities, including  
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Defense Manpower Development Plan for an Elite Force (Seoul: Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, 
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43 Ibid, 100 
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currently operational modern equipment and future R&D investments for the next 
generation of weaponry.  Ordinary operating costs rose to 13.7570 trillion wons, up 8.8 
percent from FY 2004. 
 
Table 6. The ROK Nominal Defense Budgets, FY 2004 – FY 2005  
 










Increase/Decrease (%)FY 2005 (%)FY 2004 (%)Classification
 
 
As observed in Table 6, the nominal amount of the ROK defense 
expenditures has grown.  However, Figure 545 shows that the real ratio of the defense 
budgets have been declining due to such factors as market prices, the high cost of 
advanced weapons systems, and increased salaries in line with the growing national 
income.  As a result, the ROK military has not had the flexibility to foster a cooperative, 
self-reliant national defense.  The financial requirements in future manpower force 
structure, as well as technological aspects of the ROK defense, will be more demanding.  
According to the Defense Reform, the annual increase of the defense budgets should be 
11 percent until FY 2015,46 which means that defense expenditures must be allocated at a 
stable rate of at least 3.0 percent of GDP for the mid- to long-term perspectives.47 
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Figure 5. Defense in Government Budgets and GDP 
 
g. Social Factors     
The ROK Army manpower force structure planners must not overlook 
social factors.  This is crucial because the social support for the ROK military is based on 
the compulsory conscription.  This is the primary reason that the fourth key points of the 
ROK National Defense is to establish “the Image of a Trustworthy Military.”48  The draft 
systems of the ROK government are directly related to its military organization and force 
structure.  The human resource elements are provided mainly by those who must serve in 
the military regardless of their desire to do so; in many cases they serve against their will.  
For this reason, the draft system inherently conflicts with the utilities and interferes with 
the professionalism of the ROK military.  During the year of 2005 alone, the ROK 
military built a negative image from several incidents: the ongoing allegation of military 
exemptions for a significant number of sons of public figures; the scandal of the ROK 
Army general promotion board; the shooting rampage by a corporal at a general post in 
the DMZ; the disappearance of an ROK Navy special operation vessel; and the accidental 
crash of ROK Air Force jet fighters.  As previously mentioned, training enlisted 
personnel from the draft to be suited for a technology-oriented military, is not cost-
effective.  Since the ROK Government foresees that the reality of an all-voluntary 
military is not probable until the year 2020, the ROK military must attempt to get the full 
support of society by concentrating more efforts on building trust.  This may be possible 
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by developing a professional officer and non-commissioned officer corps, while 
reviewing the current size of the enlisted personnel.  This must be the basic concept of 
the “quantitative slimming and qualitative specialization” of the ROK military. 
 
B. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter examined existing factors that influence future manpower force 
planning of the ROK Army, based on capabilities-based planning.  The main findings in 
the chapter is a high correlation between a military’s flexibility and capabilities.  
Additionally, that there are several factors for consideration when manpower planners 
review future ROK Army manpower force structures.  The factors are summarized as: 
• Military Threats:  Eminent threats from North Korea are ongoing and can 
be categorized into five major threats of North Korea, and the necessary 
capability requirement against such threats, identified by the ROK MND.  
Besides the eminent military threat from North Korea, the ROK Army also 
must include potential threats from neighboring militaries.  Such a 
challenge must be accomplished through capabilities-based planning, 
which will allow the ROK Army enough flexibility to counteract uncertain 
threats in the future.  The implementation of these reforms has to be 
accomplished by training selected manpower to realize the future 
technologies in military capabilities. 
• Military Strategy:  A force structure is a realization of the tangible human 
resource element in the ROK military strategy.  Military strategy decides 
the size of force and shapes the human resource elements into a force 
structure that helps achieve the military objective.  The ROK military has 
maintained its defensive strategy and such strategy is unlikely to change in 
future.  This factor will maintain the ROK Army as the main military 
component in the ROK military.  However, advantages from such 
defensive postures must not interfere with giving more independent 
maneuverability and operational sustainability for lower units in order to 
gain capabilities designed for more flexibility. 
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• Geography and Strategic Culture:  Due to Korean geography and the 
strategic culture of Korean history, the ROK military does not exhibit 
itself as a projecting power.  This factor, is already imbedded in the ROK 
Constitution and specified as the first national security objective.  The 
ROK Army will remain as the main service branch, unless strategic 
culture changes occur in the future.  Therefore, it is important to reform 
the current ROK Army into one that will maintain the security initiative on 
the Korean Peninsula. 
• Technologies:  “Qualitative slimming and t qualitative specialization”49 
suggests that the direction of the ROK military reform is to trim its current 
manpower size while specializing the remaining manpower to properly 
operate newly adopted technologies such as Command & Control, 
Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) Systems, and new 
weapons systems.  The ROK Army manpower force structure should be 
planned in accordance with such military technologies. 
• Defense Budget:  The Defense Reform will result in more demanding 
financial requirements to foster the future manpower force structure and 
technological reforms of the ROK defense.  However, the financial 
situation of the current ROK military suggests that the real ratio of the 
defense budgets must maintain at least 3.0 percent of GDP if it is to 
provide the ROK military enough flexibility to foster a cooperative, self-
reliant national defense. 
• Social Factors:  The ROK military must attempt to get the full support of 
society, concentrating more efforts on building trust.  This is accomplished 
by professionalizing the officer and non-commissioned officer corps, 
while reviewing the current size of the enlisted personnel.  
These factors identified above, although not inclusive, are ones that influence the 
ROK Army manpower force structure planning.  With such factors, a capabilities based 
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planning should be conducted by the top leaders of the ROK military to determine 
adequate capabilities of the ROK Army as a whole entity, and then this method will be 
followed by numerous Bottom-Up approaches by manpower planners for each unit 
within the ROK Army organization.  When all the ‘Bottom-Up’ approaches are 
aggregately integrated into one manpower force structure, they will be reviewed and 
practiced for the Reform in the ROK Army manpower force structure to be finalized.  In 
the next chapter, the research will build a model of an ROK Army infantry battalion with 
required capabilities for the future battlefield. This will be done in order to suggest a 
feasible mix of manpower ratios among officers, NCOs and enlisted personnel to be a 
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IV. BOTTOM-UP APPROACH: ROK ARMY INFANTRY 
BATTALION 
A. THE BASIS FOR CHANGE 
Using the previous chapters as a fundamental base, this chapter will introduce 
manpower force structures of four similar but different ground forces’ infantry battalions 
in forms of Modified Table of Organizations and Equipments (MTOE); the ROK Army, 
the United States Army (USA), United States Marine Corps (USMC) and Taiwanese 
Army.  Such comparative analyses will show the distinct differences in capabilities 
generated from linking each manpower requirement with its respective equipment among 
the four infantry units and to identify capabilities different from that in the current ROK 
infantry battalions. 
The fundamental combat mission of the infantry battalion, regardless of 
the type of battalion, is to close off the enemy by means of fire and 
maneuver to destroy or capture him, or to repel his assaults by fire, close 
combat, and counterattack.  To accomplish specific missions and conduct 
sustained operations, the battalion is normally augmented by additional 
combat, CS, and CSS assets.50  
 — Mission, The Infantry Battalion, 
US Army Field Manual, FM 7-20 
Chapter II reviewed the current Republic of Korea (ROK) Army manpower force 
structure and identified limitations and challenges in realizing the objective and 
directions stated in the Defense Reform Plan 2020 (the Reform Plan).  Additionally, 
Chapter III identified contributing factors that influenced the Top-Down approach to 
ROK Army manpower force structure planning followed by a Bottom-Up approach for 
each organic unit structured under the ROK Army.  The results is a determination ROK 
Army capabilities that realize objectives and missions that contribute to the execution of 
ROK National Security Objectives.  The research identifies missing ROK infantry 
battalion capabilities and combines them with required capabilities identified in Chapter 
III.  The results will be a ROK infantry battalion model with new manpower ratios among 
officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and enlisted personnel.  This is merely one 
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Bottom-Up approach that compares like units with similar but different functions and 
capabilities.  However, it is significantly meaningful to compare a current ROK Army 
infantry unit to other nations with advanced ground armed forces.   
Table 7 clarifies the four militaries’ NCOs and enlisted personnel ranking 
systems.  This will serve as a guide when same rank titles with different pay grades are 
used. 
Table 7.  Army NCO and Enlisted Rank Systems Among Militaries 
PrivatePrivatePrivate Private (PVT)E-1 
CorporalPrivate First Class Private Private First Class (PFC)E-2 
SergeantLance Corporal (LCPL)Private First Class Corporal (CPL)E-3 
Staff SergeantCorporal Specialist (SPC)/CorporalSergeant (SGT)E-4 
Sergeant First 
ClassSergeant Sergeant Staff Sergeant (SSGT)E-5 
Master SergeantStaff Sergeant Staff Sergeant Sergeant First ClassE-6 












Master Gunnery Sergeant 
(MGYSGT)
Sergeant Major-E-9 




B. CURRENT ROK INFANTRY BATTLION 
There are generally two kinds of infantry battalions in the ROK Army, 
mechanized and non-mechanized known as “foot infantry.”  The infantry battalion shown 
in Figure 6 is a non-mechanized infantry battalion that mostly exists under the First 
Republic of Korea Army (FROKA) along the line of the Eastern Front of the Korean 
Peninsula51.   
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This particular battalion is structured under an infantry regiment.  An important 
consideration that two of three other battalions of international ground forces (the US 
Army and Taiwanese Army) are structured under infantry brigades having more 
independent operational capabilities.  The senior level unit’s, operational capabilities can 
vary significantly.  Future ROK infantry battalions will require more independent 
operational capabilities such as enhanced firepower, maneuverability and combat service 
support (CSS).  In other words, military flexibility and its capabilities are closely related, 
and therefore, a capabilities-based planning ‘Top-Down’ approach to force structure 
produces flexibility by allowing lower level tactical units independent operational 
capabilities through ‘Bottom-Up’ approaches such as an infantry battalion. 
 
Figure 6.  ROK Infantry Battalion 
 
Due to the nature of force structure, specific numbers of personnel and equipment 
in any ROK MTOE are classified, meaning exact numbers cannot be stated in the 
research.  Instead, ratios of officers, NCOs and enlisted personnel in each respected 
subordinate unit under the battalion will be shown.  These ratios reveal elements that 
cause the ROK infantry battalion to be less capable, and hence, less flexible.  As 
previously noted, there are also required capabilities identified from the factors analysis 
of the ROK Army manpower force structure.  Analyzed facts in perspective of lacking 
capabilities from this organization are listed:   
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• Low ratios of officers and NCOs:  The manpower ratios of 4.2:6.8:89.7 
among officers, NCOs and enlisted personnel reaffirm the finding in 
Chapter II that the ROK Army heavily depends on the enlisted personnel 
whose turnover ratio is very high.  Frequent and repetitive education / 
training for new soldiers into units nor excessive personnel management 
requirement for officers correlate with combat readiness of the unit; 
therefore, it is not cost or combat effective. 
• NCO Workload:  Despite the ROK Army’s emphasis on the role of NCOs, 
the actual ratio of NCOs is significantly small, resulting in increased 
workloads on the current ROK NCO Corps.  This negatively influences 
their performance and morale. 
• CSS:  CSS capabilities in the military can generally be categorized into 
logistics support, personnel service support, and health services support.  
Inherently, a typical infantry battalion is known to have limited combat 
sustainability.  However, CSS capability of a ROK infantry battalion, by 
far, is relatively most limited, and CSS capabilities of other foreign 
battalions in later sections will prove such claim.  The battalion has 
limited medical support and chaplain service capabilities.  These 
capabilities are mainly provided from the regiment level.52   
• Combat Post (CP) Vulnerability:  The battalion Headquarters has limited 
force protection capabilities, making it vulnerable against enemy attacks to 
the battalion Combat Post. (CP)53 
• Information Collection:  The battalion is the smallest tactical unit that is 
closest to its enemy during combat, but lacks information collection 
capabilities for higher commands.   
                                                 
52 A ROK infantry regiment maintains one Chaplain Section and a Medical Company.  Not to mention 
limitations of the Chaplain Section during war, the Medical Company does not have required supporting 
manpower and equipment to cover all the units under the Regiment. 
53 As introduced in previous chapter, a North Korean infantry regiment and its subordinate battalions 
maintain one Light Infantry Company and one Scout Platoon respectively.  Their main mission during war 
is to infiltrate and attack the enemy Combat Posts (CP).  Such enemy assets will pose a great threat to the 
ROK counterparts. 
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• Anti-armor Capabilities:  Currently, the weapons company under the 
battalion consists of one K-4, 40 mm automatic grenade launcher platoon, 
three 81 mm mortar platoons and one M-67 90 mm Recoilless Rifle 
platoon.  This limits the battalion’s anti-armor capability.  The 90 mm 
Recoilless Rifles (M-67) equipped in the battalion are obsolete anti-tank 
weapons, developed by the U.S. Military during the Korean War and 
extensively used by the U.S. armed forces in the Vietnam War.  This 
weapon may be effective when employed against tanks developed until the 
1970s, but not against any of the modernized or upgraded versions.54  This 
is an essential capability for the battalion’s operational flexibility, because 
friendly armor or anti-tank assets from upper units cannot guarantee their 
support. 
• Fire Support Coordination:  The battalion is authorized one liaison officer 
(LNO) whose mission is to coordinate fire support from friendly air assets.  
In artillery support, one field artillery officer as a forward observer (FO) is 
typically attached—therefore, not shown in the MTOE—to the battalion 
from its combat support field artillery battalion.  As the modern battlefield 
expands due to longer range ammunitions, digitized command and control 
systems, and more mobility of units, each organic unit of the battalion will 
operate further away and require fire support in different targets, 
sometimes simultaneously.  Therefore, the current LNO and FO must be 
augmented. 
When these elements and required capabilities are incorporated into one set of 
capabilities and adequately determined for the battalion, a flexible future ROK infantry 
battalion will exist with: 
• More NCO in the battalion 
• Enhanced anti armor capabilities 
                                                 
54 The main battle tank of North Korean Army is domestically upgraded version of Russian T-62A, 
known as the Ch’onma-ho.  Firstly observed in 1992, these tanks are now upgraded to mount 125 mm guns 
and modernized fire control systems, not to mention its armor protection.  With outdated anti-tank weapon 
such as 90 mm Recoilless Rifle, a ROK infantry battalion will only have anti-armor capabilities against 
North Korean Type 63 or PT-85 amphibious tanks but will have to solely depend upon friendly armor units 
or anti armor units which may not be there for infantry units all the time. 
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• Enhanced CSS capabilities 
• Enhanced fire support coordination 
• Intelligence collection capabilities 
• Force Protection: C.P. Security 
 
C. UNITED STATES ARMY INFANTRY BATTALION 
According to the Army Strategic Planning Guidance, one of the U.S. Army force 
planning objectives is to increase the Combatant Commander’s ability to rapidly defeat 
any adversary or control any situation across the full range of military operations.  This is 
accomplished by, “developing more modular, strategically responsive organizations, 
cultivating, and institutionalizing a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset throughout the 
force.”55  Colonel R. Smith from the Army’s Future Center within Training and Doctrine 
Command (TRADOC) defines the concept of modularity as to provide combatant 
commanders more versatile land power, and this can be achieved by taking the old type 
of infantry division apart in a “task-organized” and “self-contained” way.56  In other 
words, a modular military organization possesses the flexibility to operate in any threat 
environment through rapid deployments, greater firepower and increased internal 
sustainability.  This is in line with capabilities-based objective and directions of the ROK 
Defense Reform Plan 2020 introduced in Chapter II. 
Many distinctive factors separate an ROK battalion and a USA infantry battalion 
as shown in Figures 6 and 7. 
 
                                                 
55 Department of the Army. The Army Plan FY 2006 – 2023. Washington D.C.: Department of the 
Army, 2006, 7 
56 Colonel Smith, Rickey, The Army Modular Force, The United States Army, 23 Feb. 2005 . 
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Figure 7.  US Army Infantry Battalion 
 
One of the most notable is that the US Army ratios of 6.9:34.0:59.1 officers, 
NCOs and enlisted 57  account for 684 manpower requirements.  An examination of 
MTOE shows that section and squad leader leadership billets are filled with NCOs who 
are E-5 or E-6.  This explains why the NCO ratio in a ROK Army infantry battalion is 
comparatively low to squad leaders billets filled by conscripted E-4s.  Additionally, many 
essential billets requiring technical expertise within the battalion’s Headquarters 
Company are filled with experienced NCOs.  Such specialized expertise and trained 
leadership skills.  In the US Army battalion, NCOs provide effective troop training.  The  
 
                                                 
57 The U.S. military often does not distinguish NCOs from enlisted personnel In order to have 
conformity to the ROK military rank systems, personnel whose pay grades are E-5 and above are 
considered as NCOs while E-4 and below are enlisted personnel. 
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NCO battalion workload conducts training, personnel management and other 
administrative functions in leadership billets that are allocated throughout the respective 
chain of command.   
CSS capabilities of the battalion such as logistics support (supply, transportation, 
maintenance and field services), personnel service support (personnel and administration, 
chaplain operations and Enemy prisoner of war (EPW) operations), and health services 
(medical treatment and evacuation of casualties, preventive medicine and medical supply 
operations) are mostly self-contained.  The results are fewer battalion requirements for 
crucial combat service support elements such as medical support and chaplain operations, 
therefore providing greater flexibility for independent operations.   
The US Army MTOE shown in Figure 8 shows the number of authorized 
transportation units (56 vehicles within the battalion HQs Company alone) in the 
battalion increasing flexibility through maneuverability.  The addition of more equipment 
inevitably requires more trained personnel to operate.  The entire ROK battalion is 
authorized 25 percent less vehicles than Headquarters company of its U.S. Army 
counterpart. 
Critical CSS capabilities are shown by the U.S. Army infantry battalion vehicle 
structure shown in Figure 8.  The US Army understands that combat power maximization 
is directly linked to sustainment, because it maintains battles by allowing forces to 
concentrate their coordinated combat efforts at the decisive time and place. 58  
Historically, the ROK military has not put such emphasis on sustainability of its forces.  
One explanation of this inflexibility is the heavy reliance of the U.S. military.  As 
introduced in Chapter II, one of the ROK Ministry of National Defense’s (MND) key 
defense points is “Pursuit of Cooperative Self-Reliant Defense.”  The cooperative self-
reliant defense is a paradox in a sense that “cooperative” and “self-reliant” do not share 
any similarity.  This simply implies that the ROK military has to depend on allies for its 
national defense, which can only be construed as less capability, therefore, less 
flexibility.  This inflexibility and reliance must be overcome in the future. 
                                                 
58 Federation of American Scientists, Combat Service Support, 1998. Available from 
http://www.fas.org/man/daod-101/sys/land/css.htm  (Last accessed 02/22/06). 
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Figure 8.  US Army Battalion Transportation Capability 
 
Another example of self-contained CSS capability is illustrated in Figure 9.  
Medical platoons are organic to the battalion to provide critically wounded battalion 
members emergency medical treatment.  The requirements are one field surgeon (O-3) 
and one physicians assistant (O-3); providing combat medical service by 15 trauma 
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Figure 9.  U.S. Army Infantry Battalion Organic Medical Platoon 
 
The U.S. Army infantry organic unit structures of battalion’s scout platoon and 
sniper squad is shown in Figure 10.  Missions of the Scout platoon (led by one O-2 
platoon leader and three E-6 squad leaders) are to provide security and reconnaissance for 
the battalion.  Advanced warning of the enemy locations and strengths is conducted 
through reconnaissance and security operations, while providing security for the battalion 
and its Combat Post (C.P.).59  The primary mission of the sniper squad (led by E-6 squad 
leader) is to support combat operations by delivering precise long-range fire on selected 
targets in order to provide the battalion an operational initiative. 60   The secondary 
mission of the sniper is collecting and reporting battlefield information.  These organic 
units provide flexibility through force protection and information collection capabilities. 
 
                                                 
59 Federation of American Scientists, Combat Service Support, 1998. Available from 
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/iobc/cae2lp.htm (Last accessed 03/02/06). 
60 The sniper squad provides the battalion an initiative by creating casualties among enemy troops, 




Platoon Leader w/ M4,PEQ-2,PVS-14












Scout Squad X 3
Platoon Headquarter
M998 AND M24 w/AN/PVS-10 AND M107
Squad Leader w/ M4,PEQ-2,PVS-7
Senior SNIPER w/ M9,PAQ-4,PVS-7
SNIPER w/ M203,PAQ-4,PVS-7
SNIPER* w/ M4,PAQ-4,PVS-7










Figure 10.  US Army Infantry Battalion Organic Scout Platoon and Sniper Squad  
 
The U.S. infantry battalion delivers its anti-armor capabilities through 18 
Command Launch Units that fire “Javelin” missiles.  This illustrates the U.S. military’s 
effort to integrate hi-tech weapons systems that are operated by skilled personnel.  In 
each weapons squad (led by E-6 squad leaders) has two sets of advanced anti-tank 
weapon systems and are operated by squad leaders and three E-4 anti-armor specialists. 61  
These weapons systems provide the U.S. Army infantry battalion a self-contained anti-
armor capability.   
The U.S. Infantry Battalion fire support coordination capability is comprised of 
four platoons, each with a fire support officer (O-2), a fire support sergeant (E-6), a 
forward observer (E-5), a fire support specialist (E-4) and a radio operator (E-3).  These 
units will be detached to organic companies or platoons to effectively coordinate fire 
support from higher command fire elements.  In addition, a joint service Air Force officer 
(O-3) as the Battalion Tactical Air Controller is responsible for coordinating a friendly 
fire support such as close air support (CAS). 
                                                 
61 Javelin is the first anti-armor missile with “fire and forget” capability, and its minimum back-blast 
allows the missile to be fired in a concealed area. 
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Figure 11.  US Army Infantry Battalion Fire Coordination Capability 
 
A review of the US Army’s infantry battalion MTOE shows what capabilities a 
ROK infantry battalion lacks.  The U.S. Army infantry battalion maintains operational 
flexibility against various adversaries with less support from the higher commands.   
 
D. UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS INFANTRY BATTALION 
An organizational diagram of a USMC infantry battalion is shown in Figure 12.  
The ratios of officers, NCOs and enlisted personnel are 4.8:40.4:54.7, similar to the US 
Army infantry battalion NCO ratio (40.4%) and significantly higher than the ROK and 
the U.S. Army counterparts (4.7% and 34.0% respectively).  A review of the USMC 
infantry battalion MTOE defines its NCO differently, in that the ROK and the U.S. Army 
defines their NCOs as those enlisted personnel whose pay grades are E-5 and above, 
USMC include E-4 within its NCO.  USMC generally consider E-4s and E-5s as NCOs 
and E-6s and above as Staff NCOs.  This shifts down the average age of NCO group of 
USMC based on strategic characteristic of Marine Corps, which will be discussed later.  
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Figure 12.  US Marine Corps Infantry Battalion 
 
Several interesting manpower factors are revealed when reviewing an USMC 
infantry battalion MTOE.  First notable aspect is that there is the fundamental number 
three throughout the organization.  Relevant factors: 
• There are three 4-men fire teams, making up one rifle squad 13 personnel 
with an E-4 as the squad leader.  Unlike the U.S. Army, there is no 
weapons squad in the platoon. 
• There are three infantry platoons under three rifle companies to the 
battalion.  Weapons Company is seen as combat supporting arms while the 
Headquarters and Service (H&S) company has CCS roles for the battalion. 
This number three appears over the evolution of USMC.  In May 1944, 
Headquarters, USMC standardized the 13-Marine rifle squad under Table of 
Organization known as F–1.  The basic 13 Marine rifle squad has remained the standard 
organization into the twenty-first century because of its flexibility and effectiveness.62  
Compared to the ROK and U.S. Army rifle squads consisting of two fire-teams, a USMC 
                                                 
62 WW2 Gyrene, The Marine Rifle Squad, 2004. Available from 
http://www.ww2gyrene.org/rifle_squad.htm (Last accessed 02/23/06). 
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rifle squad is composed of three fire-teams of four men, each led by a Corporal (E-3).  
Controlling three is also consistent with the US Army rifle squad where there are two 4-
man fire-teams with one squad leader, making up a 9-man squad.  However, the ROK 
Army rifle squad consists of two 5-man fire teams.  It is easier to control three rather than 
four men in the fog of combat.   
The second point worth mentioning is the total battalion manpower numbers.  The 
USMC infantry battalion is bulkier than the three other battalions (fewer than 600 for the 
ROK Army and 684 for the U.S.)  Interestingly, the main reason behind the total number 
is related to these expeditionary missions.  USMC forces are required to deploy in a very 
short period of time to secure the beachhead.  A USMC battalion operates in a larger area 
of responsibility (AOR) than follow on forces that requires more personnel to cover the 
AOR.  The first fight in battle means greater unit casualties.  Since a Marine unit does not 
have the luxury of ample support, they have to fight with what they bring to battle.  This 
explains why a USMC infantry battalion is bulkier than an Army infantry battalion. 
The third point is the USMC battalion NCO structure tends to be more bottom-
heavy, whereas the US Army counterpart is more top-heavy.  This means that a USMC 
battalion depends on younger and junior E-5 and E-4s NCOs while the US Army 
battalion focuses on the contrary.  Table 8 shows an Army battalion percentage of E-6 
and above the Army battalion is 14.59 percent, whereas the same Marine NCO group is 
about 50 percent less (7.72 percent).  This pattern becomes apparent as most of the Army 
squad leader billets are filled by E-6s and USMC’s are filled by E-4s.  Marine NCOs who 
are E-6s and above are Staff NCOs who mostly work in the battalion headquarters level 
while E-5s and below mostly remain in the company level.  Structural differences lie in 
the expeditionary nature of the USMC.  These inherent expeditionary missions require 
more E-4s and below in combat elements out of its tactical necessity, which speed 
requires younger E-4s and below who are generally more physically fit than E-5s and 
above.   
A manpower review of the USMC infantry battalion MTOE shows ratios 
designed to support the inherent capabilities required for its unique strategic 
expeditionary missions. 
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A comparison of a USMC infantry battalion and its US Army counterpart shows 
the organic Service (SVC) Platoon and Medical Platoon CSS capabilities to the battalion.  
The comparative analysis also shows a battalion surgeon with eight battalion corpsmen, 
three company corpsmen and thirty platoon corpsmen for the medical services.  In 
battalion Headquarter & Service (H&S) Company, there are forty vehicles authorized in 
H&S Company including utility heavy trucks (2.5 tons), ambulances, and High Mobility 
Multipurpose wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV’s).   
A USMC infantry battalion has limited force protection capabilities such as scout 
platoon organic to a U.S. Army infantry battalion.  However, one section sized sniper 
platoon provides combat operations support and information collecting capabilities.  In 
addition, it has limited fire support coordination capabilities such as fire support platoons 
or tactical air controller observed in the Army MTOE.  Nevertheless, the battalion is 
supported with direct and indirect firepower from an 81 mm Mortar Platoon, an Anti-tank 
Platoon and a Heavy Machinegun Platoon under Weapons Company organic to the 


























































In summary, the USMC infantry battalion has been designed to fit the unique 
characteristic of expeditionary missions.  Therefore, it has limited force protection, 
information gathering, and fire support coordination capabilities.  Similarly, the ROK 
infantry battalion is organic to a regiment whereas the US Army infantry battalion falls 
under a brigade.  The deficient capabilities may be provided by higher commands, but at 
the trade-off of operational flexibility.  A comparison of the two infantry battalions shows 
that the ROK Army infantry battalion should benchmark the US Army because the future 
ROK Army will require more flexibility than expeditionary capability.  Additionally, 
current ROK Army infantry battalion manpower requirements are too small to  
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benchmark from the USMC counterpart at 874 personnel.  However, the high USMC 
infantry battalion NCO ratio must be positively reviewed by ROK Army manpower 
planners. 
 
E. TAIWANESE ARMY INFANTRY BATTALION 
1. Background 
There are several beneficial reasons to examine the Taiwanese Army’s infantry 
battalion organization: 
• ROK military shares a similarity with Taiwanese military in that both 
currently face an eminent threat.  Taiwan has been reforming its military 
through downsizing and transform to technology-based armed forces in 
view of similar threats. 
• Both countries base manpower acquisition on conscription laws. 
• Both countries are dependent on the U.S. military. 
As with other defense reforms, Taiwan’s Defense Reforms began by defining and 
articulating the national security strategy and a setting of corresponding defense policies 
as a central theme.  According to Michael Swaine and James Mulvenon, Taiwan’s 
strategic objectives are; first, deter China from using force against the island, second, 
seek increased support from the United States and third, reassure the Taiwan public of the 
government’s efforts to ensure the island’s security.63  However, in the 1990s, there were 
significant changes in Taiwanese military strategy, shifting from emphasizing offensive 
and defensive operations to focusing only on.  This was based on the government’s 
official and permanent abandonment of intentions to retake the mainland.  President Chen 
Shui-bian and his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) led this offensive-based defensive 
strategy.  The Taiwan Ministry of National Defense (Taiwan MND) places strong 
emphasis on paralyzing the enemy’s war-fighting capability before it reaches the island.  
In order to achieve such an objective, the Taiwanese military would have to further 
develop its offensive capability.  An offensive capability would provide Taiwan the  
 
                                                 
63 Michael D. Swaine and James C. Mulvenon, Taiwan’s Foreign and Defense Policies: Features and 
Determinants (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001). 
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initiative to destroy Chinese forces at sea, in the air, and possibly launching precision 
strikes deep inland at Chinese command and control centers, CSS capabilities and other 
strategic targets.64 
Downsizing the military while rationalizing the structure of the armed forces for 
future warfare is typical of defense reforms.  There were two phases in Taiwanese 
defense reform; the first, known as the Jing Shi (translated as “streamlining and 
consolidation”) program became effective in July 1997.  The program has reduced the 
number of Taiwanese military personnel from 450,000 to approximately 385,000.  
Additionally it cut down the size of manpower and other reform elements, such as 
simplifying the chain of command, consolidating military educational institutions, 
streamlining high-level staff units and reducing the number of general officers, especially 
in the ground forces.65   A notable aspect related to the research, the program also 
restructured the Taiwanese ground forces from divisions into smaller and more mobile 
combined arms brigades.  As seen in the objectives of Taiwanese military strategy, 
seeking increased support from the United States, the Taiwanese ground forces mirror the 
U.S. Army organization.  Considering the heavy dependency on the U.S. military, such 
reorganization of force structure may bring about some positive outcomes, especially 
when Taiwanese ground forces are afforded the opportunity to adopt U.S. weapon 
systems.   
Starting in 2005, the Taiwan MND started its second phase of defense reform, the 
Jing Jin (enterprising) force consolidation project.  The first stage cut manpower from 
385,000 to 340,000 by 2006; the second stage reduced total manpower of the armed 
forces 300,00066 scheduled to be accomplished by 2012.  According to a US Pentagon 
report, the goal of the troop reductions is to “create a smaller army with greater mobility 
and firepower.”67 
                                                 
64 Su Tzu-yun, The Revolution of Taiwan’s Defense Strategy and Defense Concept of Taiwan’s New 
Administration Taiwan Defense Affairs 1:1 (Taipei, October 2000), 124-125. 
65 Michael S. Chase, Defense Reform in Taiwan: Problems and Prospects Asian Survey, VOL. XLV, 
No 3, May/June 2005, 370. 
66 “Troop Numbers to Be Trimmed Back,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), July 2, 2003. 
67 U.S. Department of Defense, The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
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2. Taiwanese Army Infantry Battalion 
A Taiwanese mechanized infantry battalion under the brigade is shown in Figure 
13.  The Taiwanese Army enlisted pay grade systems ranges from E-1 to E-7.  The E-3s 
and above pay grades are considered NCOs whereas E-2s and below are enlisted 
personnel.  Taiwan’s battalion officers, NCOs and enlisted personnel ratios are 
6.1:11.3:82.6.  The infantry battalion NCO ratio (11.3 percent) is a third of the USMC 
(40.4 percent).  This ratio is larger than a ROK Army infantry battalion (4.7%) which 
shows that the Taiwanese military is facing a similar challenge as the ROK.  This issue 
results from the notion that enlisted conscripts are guaranteed for recruiting and retaining 
compared to problems generated officers and NCO groups.   
Figure 13. Taiwanese Infantry Battalion 
 
Figure 13 represents a reorganized into a mechanized battalion due to Defense 
Reform.  Due to the organization’s structure is simpler than the other three battalion 
organizations, mainly because there is no weapons company, but instead, an additional 
rifle company.  The reorganized weapons company elements have been absorbed into 
either Battalion Headquarters Company (120 mm Heavy Mortar Platoon) the Rifle 
Company (Javelin Anti-armor Section).   
Taiwanese Battalion CSS capabilities possess greater internal capability than 
ROK mechanized infantry battalions with an organic medical platoon.  The battalion 
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provides long-range precision fire against the enemy and information collection 
capabilities by the organic sniper section.   
Taiwanese battalions do not possess chaplain services like the US Army and 
USMC nor do they have force protection capabilities (US Army).  However, the 
Taiwanese military has been executing a Bottom-Up its defense reform to acquire 
increased capabilities in support of the national military strategy. 
 
F. SUMMARY: A SUGGESTED MODEL FOR A FUTURE ROK ARMY 
INFANTRY BATTALION  
A comparative analysis among four infantry battalions focuses on missing 
capabilities in the current ROK Army infantry battalion MTOE.  Clearly, manpower and 
equipments differentiate the ROK Army infantry battalion from advanced U.S. infantry 
units.  In addition, the research found that the Taiwanese military has already enacted 
defense reforms significantly improving its ground forces to meet required capabilities.  
Missing capabilities in comparison to advanced infantry battalions, combined with 
Chapter III required capabilities are summarized as below: 
• Significantly increased NCO ratio 
• Enhanced anti-armor capabilities in the battalion 
• Enhanced CSS capabilities: medical, chaplain and transportation 
• Intelligence collection capabilities 
• Force protection for the Battalion Combat Post 
• Enhanced fire support coordination 
Comparative capabilities are shown in Table 9.  As listed previously, a ROK 





















The research shows that the ROK Army benchmark, as compared to the three 
other infantry battalions, highlights the following differences: 
• The current manpower size of the ROK infantry battalion is little less than 
600 personnel, which is far smaller than the USMC counterpart of 874 
personnel. 
• The Taiwanese Infantry Battalion has not proved itself to be combat 
effective with its current force structure.   
• Because USMC strategically focuses more on its inherent expeditionary 
missions, required capabilities for its infantry battalion must differentiate 
from one for the ROK Army battalion in the future. 
• Even though the Reform Plan does not suggests the future ROK Army 
force structures will be brigade oriented, the future ROK Army infantry 
battalion will need to be reorganized into the form of an organic combat 
element in the sense that more self-contained capability must be given to 
the battalion.  Even though there are inherent differences in several aspects 
of the capability between a battalion under a regiment and one under a 
brigade, the research concludes that an ROK battalion would gain more 
operational flexibility, similar to one in the U.S. Army infantry battalion 
under a brigade. 
• Ultimately, ROK Army will require more flexibility in the future.  This 
would bring about more independent operability, increased firepower and 
CSS from more specialized manpower and advanced equipment.  By 
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examining the current U.S. Army infantry battalion MOTE, the research 
finds the U.S. Army infantry battalion proves to be more feasible than the 
USMC battalion or the Taiwanese counterpart. 
The first future required capability is increasing the number of NCOs in the 
battalion.  The most effective means to increase the current NCO ratio in the ROK 
battalion is to replace squad leader billets currently qualified as E-4 conscript to more 
experienced E-5s and E-6s NCOs.  In addition, integrating several organic elements to 
the battalion will increase the NCOs ratio in such staff or support organizations than a 
rifle or weapons company.  After incorporating other required capabilities into the current 
ROK Army infantry battalion, the overall ratios of officers, NCOs and enlisted personnel 
will be finalized. 
Distributions of NCOs by pay grades are shown in Table 10 to help visualize how 
the three international infantry battalions NCOs are structured.  Even though the ROK 
Army infantry battalion enlisted numbers cannot be shown, the research confirms that the 
structure is more than 90 percent reliant on E-1s through E-4s.   
 
Table 10. Comparative Battalion NCO Distributions  
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The second future required capability is an enhanced anti-armor.  All other 
infantry battalions examined in this chapter have Command Launch Units (CLU) that fire 
Javelin missiles.  A Javelin fire team under a section should consist of at least three 
personnel: a gunner, an assistant gunner with replaceable missile tube, and a rifleman 
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U.S. Army infantry battalion’s such anti-armor must be organic to a rifle platoon.  
Anti-armor capability is a fire capability rather than a fire support capability. It is most 
likely the rifle platoon, if not snipers or scouts, would be the first encounters and engage 
enemy tanks or fortified positions.  Therefore, the current manpower from the organic 
90mm Recoilless Rifle Platoon to Weapons Company needs to be absorbed into the nine 
rifle platoons in the form of either an anti-armor section or a squad.  An ROK enhanced 
anti-armor manpower requirements are shown in Table 11.  Each of the nine battalion 
anti-armor sections should consist of one E-6 section leader, two E-5 anti-armor NCO as 
gunners, two E-4s for assistant gunners and two E-3 riflemen for providing security.  The 
total manpower requirement for an anti-armor-capability is 63 personnel for such: nine E-




































The current ROK Army infantry battlaion lacks several interanl CSS capabilities 
such as medical service, chaplain service and transportation services; such capabilities are 
provided by the Regiment in forms of the Medical Company, the Regimental Chaplain 
Section and Motor Pool.  Independent operational capability require these capabilities to 
be organic to each battalion as observed in comparable US battalions.  The research 
found it feasible to integrate the medical and chaplain services under the current ROK 
battalion.  A suggested organic medical platoon and a chaplain section under the current 
ROK Army infantry battalion is shown on Table 12.  With such medical and chaplain 
service capabilities, the ROK Army infantry battalion will acquire a more self-contained 
CSS capability.   
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Scout Platoon manpower requirements provides the battalion an internal 
information collection and force security capability are shown in Table 13. Under the 
leadership of the Scout platoon, there are three main missions; information 
collection/combat patrol, precision long-range fire and force protection.  Notice that the 
leadership of each squad is given to NCOs by Military Occupation Specialty (MOS).   
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Motor pool transportation requirements will increase while additional capability is 
added to the battalion.  However, as noted in the beginning of the chapter, this particular 
ROK Army infantry battalion exists mostly under the FROKA infantry regiment.  The 
geographical nature of the FROKA AOR is mostly mountainous making the unit 
transportation capability more effective when controlled in a centralized motor pool 
under each regiment.  In addition, as suggested in the Reform Plan, the ROK Army 
anticipates that 47 ROK Army divisions will be reduced to 20 by the end of the year of 
2020.  However, there is no sign in the Reform Plan, suggesting that the ROK Army 
force structure be transformed into infantry brigade-oriented units except for those along 
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the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) line.68  However, this research still characterizes a future 
infantry battalion of the ROK Army with greater organic capability to overcome 
limitations caused by the inflexibility of the current force structure.   
Lastly, in order to improve fire support coordination, the ROK infantry battalion 
must enhance the current forward observer (FO) in each section. A fire support 
coordination manpower section is shown in Table 14. 
 
















Replaced with the current forward observer, a section led by one field artillery 
officer with three teams of fire support teams as suggested in Table 14.  The forward 
observer will provide each rifle company with effective fire support through team 
coordination. 
The future proposed ROK Army infantry battaion is shown in Figure 14.  This 
particular Bottom-Up approach is based on the objective and direction of the ROK 
Defense Reform Plan 2020, which foresees a future ROK Army with flexibility and more 
capabilities to actively respond to uncertain threats.  The research shows flexible 
capability based infantry battalion that allows the battalion to operate independently.  The 
                                                 
68 The ROK Ministry of National Defense, The Defense Reform Plan 2020 (Seoul, The MND, 2005), 
21. 
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smallest tactical unit, namely an infantry battalion is afforded flexibility through 
specialized manpower and equipment to generate coordinated fire power, actively search 

















Figure 14.  Bottom-Up Approach Model 
 
Compared to the current battalion, fire teams leadership positions in each rifle 
squad, and most sections in the old battalion are replaced by E-5s.  In addition, the 
battalion is augmented by several combat and CSS elements with increased manpower 
and equipment by Military Occupation Specialties (MOS).  The research suggests the 
new battalion ratio among officers, NCOs and enlisted personnel be 4.6:21.0:74.4.  The 
significant NCO ratio increased from 4.7 percent, remains behind the US Army (34.0 
percent) and USMC (40.4 percent), and according to Dr. Kwan Ho Cho of the Korean 
Institute of Defense Analysis (KIDA), a feasible ratio of officers and NCOs by 2020 
should change from 10 to 12 percent and from 25 to 30 percent respectively.69  This 
recommended change is based on a targeted 2020 manpower force structure size of 
370,000, benchmarking of foreign predecessors and manpower accession and 
                                                 
69 Kwan Ho Cho, “Direction of Manpower Structures Development for a Successful Defense 
Reform,” Weekly Defense Journal, (January 2006). 
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employment policies based on the conscription laws.  The Reform Plan dues not 
anticipate an all volunteer force in the near future that could inhibit the ability of the 
current personnel management system to recruit quality officers and NCOs. 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The Republic of Korea (ROK) Defense Reform Plan 2020 introduced a notion of 
“qualitative elitism” of current ROK defense manpower force structures. 70  The objective 
of “qualitative elitism” is executed through two tasks: downsizing the ROK Army 
manpower force structure while simultaneously specializing manpower to operate newly 
acquired and available resources reallocated from downsizing.  This approach is known 
as “quantitative slimming and qualitative specialization of force.”71   
The Reform Plan calls for a 97.8 percent reduction in manpower for the ROK 
Army.  The basis of the Reform Plan is the alignment of strategic objectives through a 
Top-Down approach with its ROK Army military capabilities.  The Top-Down approach 
reduces manpower by 177,000 Army personnel targeting a ratio of 40:60 between 
officers/non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and enlisted personnel 20:80.  To realize this 
strategic goal, the research emphasized numerous Bottom-Up approaches to conform 
with the Top-Down approach.  The ratio of commissioned officers, NCOs and enlisted 
personnel of 9:11:80 is feasible for the recommend future ROK Army infantry battalion. 
The research build a model based on current ROK battalion capabilities.  In order 
to execute the Reform Plan, the research found that the ROK Army force structure must 
change—from threat-based planning to modern capabilities-based planning as introduced 
in Chapter II.  In search of such capabilities, the research followed the steps: 
• Identify ROK Army challenges in order to deter a North Korean invasion 
while preparing against unspecified threats in the Northeast Asia region.  
To overcome such challenges, the ROK Army force structure must 
develop capabilities-based planning that provide flexibility to respond to 
both challenges. 
                                                 
70 Young Jin Cho, Kwan Ho Cho, Kil Ho Chung, Ju Sunge Chung, Won Bae Lee, and Ahn Sik Kim, 
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• The research identified required capabilities from a factors analysis of the 
ROK Army manpower force structure.  The factors considered in the 
analysis were threat, military strategy, geography, strategic culture in 
history, technological capabilities, and economic and social factors.   
• A comparative analysis among the US Army, USMC and Taiwanese 
Army infantry battalions examined tables of organization and equipment 
(MTOE) to a ROK Army infantry battalion.  The current ROK Army 
infantry organizational diagram with the overall manpower ratio among 
officers, NCOs, and enlisted personnel of 4.7:4.7:90.6 is shown in Figure 
15.   
 
Figure 15.  Current ROK Infantry Battalion 
 
• The research identified a requirement to increase the ratio of NCOs in 
order to enhance the organic anti-armor, combat service support (CSS), 
intelligence collection and force protection, and, fire support coordination 
capabilities. 
• The current ROK Army may be capable enough to deter North Korean 
aggression.  However, the research concluded that the ROK Army must 
possess the capabilities identified above if it is to resolve the dilemma of 

















unspecified threats in Northeast Asia.  The capabilities were incorporated 
into the current ROK Army infantry battalion with increased ratio 
numbers for NCOs—now 4.6:21.0:74.4 among officers, NCOs and 
enlisted personnel—and more capabilities self-contained within the 
battalion.  The research determined that the new infantry battalion model 
has more flexibility with more capabilities previously provided by upper 
commands, as shown in Figure 16. 
 
 
Figure 16.  Suggested ROK Army Infantry Battalion 
 
B. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS: TRANSFORMATIONAL 
MINDSET  
1. Research Question 1: What are the Requirements and Contributing 
Factors Facing Its Manpower Force Structure in “Defense Reform 
Plan 2020”? 
a. Conclusion 
The research concluded that the current ROK Army manpower force 
structure is primarily a threat-based force structure.  In support of the Reform Plan, the 
research identified the ROK Army challenges in order to deter a North Korean invasion 
while preparing against unspecified threats in the Northeast Asia region.  To overcome 
such challenges, the ROK Army force structure must develop capabilities-based planning 
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that provides the flexibility to respond both challenges.  In order to accomplish such 
challenges, the ROK Army manpower force structure must consider present and future 
threat, military strategy, geography, strategic culture in history, technological capabilities, 
and economic and socioeconomics factors. 
b. Recommendation 
The research recommend that the ROK Army align its manpower force 
structure to support capabilities-based planning in order to gain the flexibility required to 
actively offset any future threat in the Northeast Asia region. 
2. Research Question 2: How are the United States Army and United 
States Marine Corps Infantry Battalions Currently Structured? 
a. Conclusion 
In line with the Army Strategic Planning Guidance, the research founded 
that one of the US Army objectives in its force planning is to increase the Combatant 
Commander’s ability to rapidly defeat any adversary or control any situation throughout 
the full range of military operations.  The US believes this task can be accomplished by 
“developing more modular, strategically responsive organizations, cultivating, and 
institutionalizing a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset throughout the force.” 72   The 
research therefore concluded that a modular military organization possessed the 
flexibility to operate in any threat environment through rapid deployments, greater 
firepower and increased internal sustainability.  Review of a US Army infantry battalion 
MTOE shows that it’s manpower force structure is based on a “Joint and Expeditionary 
Mindset” with several organic combat and combat service support (CSS) elements 
providing it more flexibility and therefore requiring less support from higher commands. 
Similar characteristics were found in the USMC infantry battalion MTOE.  
However, several distinctive were noted: 
• The USMC infantry battalion manpower force structure is based on the 
fundamental number three throughout the organization.   
                                                 
72  Department of the Army. The Army Plan FY 2006 – 2023. Washington D.C.: Department of the 
Army, 2006, 7 
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• The USMC battalion is bulkier than other infantry battalions for the inherent 
expeditionary missions that require a larger area of responsibility and may 
result in more unit casualties. 
• The battalion tends to be more bottom-heavy whereas the US Army 
counterpart is more top-heavy in the NCO structure.  The USMC battalion 
operates with E-4 and E-5 NCOs who are generally more physically fit that E-
6 and above for the same reasons of expeditionary missions. 
b. Recommendation 
A comparison of the two infantry battalions shows that the ROK Army 
infantry battalion should benchmark the US Army because the future ROK Army will 
require more flexibility than expeditionary capability. 
3. What Capabilities Can the ROK Army Infantry Battalion Adopt from 
Other Organizations to Optimize Its Future Force Structure? 
a. Conclusion 
The comparative analysis among the US Army, USMC, Taiwanese Army 
and the ROK Army infantry battalions focused on current ROK Army infantry battalion 
MTOE missing capabilities. The research concluded that the ROK Army should 
incorporate the following missing capabilities: 
• Significantly increased NCO ratio focusing on pay grades of E-5 and E-6 
• Enhanced anti-armor capabilities in the battalion 
• Enhance CSS capabilities: medical, chaplain and transportation 
• Intelligence collection capabilities 
• Force protection for the Battalion Combat Post 
• Enhanced fire support coordination 
b. Recommendation 
Incorporating such capabilities into a military organization is a multi-
faceted task that includes long range accession planning and recruiting under the 
conscription environment, training, procurement and retention.   
The Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA) mandates changes to four 
essential elements: technology, weapons systems, operations concepts and force 
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structure.73  The research identifies a fifth crucial element for a successful RMA that is a 
transformational mindset to move the revolution forward.  A strategic decision-making 
process must be imbedded in every stakeholder around the ROK Reform Plan in order to 
have a transformational mindset.  The research identified three areas required for a 
successful defense reform: strategic level decision makers of the ROK military, the 
manpower community as a whole, and the ROK public. 
Capabilities-based planning must focus is on how adversaries might 
undermine the national security rather than on who and where the adversaries might be.  
This is a well-established mindset in the U.S. military.  The U.S. Department of Defense 
determines capabilities from a range of possible scenarios rather than focusing on specific 
conflicts.  Such an approach provides the commanders-in-chief with various options to 
from which to choose depending on the threat scenario.  The identification of force 
requirements based on the most demanding circumstances provides flexibility to manage 
the situation.74   
Such a capabilities-based approach will require additional and different 
capabilities.  The first step in the research assumed the Reform Plan was designed using a 
strategically based transformational mindset.  However, the research must ask how 
reliable such an assumption and do the decision makers possess the strategic beliefs to 
create the conditions for a successful defense reform? 
The ROK Army manpower community shares this transformational 
mindset in its own perspectives as it defines “qualitative elitism.”75  However, a doubtful 
look still lingers at the ROK Army manpower community when there is no respective 
progress to implement this transformational mindset into reality.  An obstacle may be in 
the gap between the conceptual progressiveness and the current manpower accession and 
personnel management systems based on conscription laws. Manpower funding may 
                                                 
73 Richard O. Hundley, Past Revolutions, Future Transformations: What Can the History of 
Revolutions in Military Affairs Tell Us about Transforming the U.S. Military? (Santa Monica: RAND, 
1999). 
74 The US Department of Defense, Appendix D, Force Structure Plan: the Department of Defense 
Base Closure and Realignment (Washington D.C., the DoD, 2005), D1- D2. 
75 Young Jin Cho, Kwan Ho Cho, Kil Ho Chung, Ju Sunge Chung, Won Bae Lee, and Ahn Sik Kim, 
Defense Manpower Development Plan for an Elite Force (Seoul: Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, 
2005), 35. 
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preclude necessary accession requirements to develop a technologically advanced force.  
Reform planners may choose to continue with cheap conscriptions accessions 
incompatible with reform goals.  In order for the military to attract high-quality personnel 
in a hi-tech future military, innovations in the ROK military accession and personnel 
management systems require the adequate allocation of defense resources.  Therefore, the 
research concludes that in order to transform ROK manpower, it must embrace the costs 
of quality accessions and technology simultaneously.  
 
C.        FURTHER RESEARCH 
This research only examined a Bottom-Up approach for a ROK infantry battalion 
force structure to suggest a feasible ratio among officers, NCOs and enlisted personnel to 
give flexibility in the twenty-first century defense environments.  There are many 
additional limitations and challenges for which the ROK Army must overcome.  What 
feasible accession methodologies can be adapted to develop the required quality 
manpower in the ROK NCO Corps. What manpower policy decisions must be made to 
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